Blumenthal Distributing, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc. ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 25 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BLUMENTHAL DISTRIBUTING, INC.,                  Nos. 18-56471, 18-56493
    DBA Office Star,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiff-counter-defendant-              5:14-cv-01926-JAK-SP
    Appellant/Cross-Appellee
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    HERMAN MILLER, INC.,
    Defendant-counter-claimant-
    Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted March 3, 2020
    Pasadena, California
    Before: HURWITZ and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,** District
    Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for
    the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    1
    This cross-appeal arises out of Herman Miller, Inc.’s (“HM’s”) claims against
    Blumenthal Distributing, Inc. d/b/a Office Star Products (“OSP”) for infringing and
    diluting its registered and unregistered claimed EAMES and AERON trade dresses.1
    1.     We reject OSP’s argument that the district court erred in holding that
    no adjustment to the infringement damages was required based on 15 U.S.C.
    § 1111’s notice-of-registration requirement. Even assuming that the award was
    subject to that requirement, there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most
    favorable to HM, that the requirement was satisfied. The hangtag’s trademark
    symbol and text stating that “HermanMiller and Eames are among the registered
    trademarks of Herman Miller, Inc.”; the evidence of OSP’s awareness of its potential
    infringement, which included an internal OSP email from September 2010
    comparing its chairs to Eames chairs; and the adverse inference warranted by OSP’s
    spoliation of records support a reasonable conclusion that OSP had notice of HM’s
    registration pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1111 as of October 2010, when OSP began
    selling the first of its accused chairs.
    2.     The district court did not abuse its discretion by upholding the jury’s
    award of infringement damages. See Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 
    673 F.3d 1105
    , 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying the abuse of discretion standard). The award
    1
    We resolve the issues of the functionality of the claimed EAMES and
    AERON trade dresses and dilution in a concurrently filed opinion.
    2
    reflected all of OSP’s profits from its sale of the accused chairs, and was justified by
    the evidence of OSP’s conscious effort to “gain the value” of the Eames chairs’
    reputation and esteem. Fifty-Six Hope Rd. Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 
    778 F.3d 1059
    , 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2015); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Moreover, in light of the
    evidence at trial of OSP’s competition against HM for sales, OSP’s profits from its
    accused chairs were at least a “crude” proxy for HM’s lost profits, which, in light of
    the evidence of OSP’s willfulness, was all that was needed. 
    Skydive, 673 F.3d at 1112
    (quoting Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, Inc., 
    6 F.3d 614
    , 621 (9th Cir. 1993)).
    3.     Even if we were to entertain OSP’s single-sentence argument that there
    was not sufficient evidence of likelihood of confusion nor of secondary meaning for
    the unregistered claimed EAMES trade dresses, the argument expressly depends on
    the assumption that those trade dresses were functional, and is thus defeated by our
    holding, set forth in our concurrently filed opinion, that the jury’s finding of their
    non-functionality was supported by sufficient evidence.
    4.     We deny HM’s motion for judicial notice as moot, as it concerns only
    legislative facts for which “[j]udicial notice . . . is unnecessary.” Von Saher v. Norton
    Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 
    592 F.3d 954
    , 960 (9th Cir. 2010). Since the
    associated exhibits contain only legislative facts, we are free to consult them to the
    extent we find them useful. See Owino v. Holder, 
    771 F.3d 527
    , 534 n.4 (9th Cir.
    2014); FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee notes.
    3
    Based on this memorandum disposition and the simultaneously filed opinion,
    we affirm the judgment in favor of HM on its causes of action for the infringement
    of its registered and unregistered claimed EAMES trade dresses; we reverse the
    judgment in favor of HM on its cause of action for dilution; and we reverse the
    portion of the judgment regarding the Aeron chairs in its entirety, and remand for a
    new trial.
    AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED.
    4