West Ventures, L.P. v. Cir ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 14 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    WEST VENTURES, L.P., FKA Sleiman                No.    19-71134
    Ventures, L.P.; ANTHONY T. SLEIMAN,
    Tax Matters Partner,                            Tax Ct. No. 24683-10
    Petitioners-Appellants,
    MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
    REVENUE,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    Appeal from a Decision of the
    United States Tax Court
    Submitted July 10, 2020**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: CLIFTON, D.M. FISHER,*** and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    West Ventures, L.P. (West Ventures) appeals the tax court’s order and
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
    decision in favor of the Commissioner. West Ventures argues that the tax court
    lacked subject matter jurisdiction to sustain the Commissioner’s disallowance of a
    $62,370,000 short-term capital loss (Loss) declared in its tax filing (Form 1065)
    for the 1999 tax year. We have jurisdiction under 
    26 U.S.C. § 7482
    (a).
    The tax court’s rulings on jurisdictional issues are reviewed de novo. See
    Gorospe v. Comm’r, 
    451 F.3d 966
    , 968 (9th Cir. 2006) (reviewing the tax court’s
    dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo); see also Taproot Admin.
    Servs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 
    679 F.3d 1109
    , 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (reviewing the tax
    court’s grant of summary judgment de novo). Because the Internal Revenue Code,
    its associated regulations, and our case law are clear that the Loss was a
    partnership item of West Ventures, the final partnership administrative adjustment
    (FPAA) was properly issued to West Ventures, the tax court had jurisdiction, and
    we affirm.1
    West Ventures’ main argument on appeal is that, in seeking to disallow the
    Loss, the Commissioner commenced proceedings against the wrong entity, and
    1
    We recognize that the tax court appears to have concluded that the Loss
    was an “affected item” of Sleiman Two. However, “[d]ecisions of the tax court are
    reviewed on the same basis as decisions from civil bench trials in the district
    court.” MK Hillside Partners v. Comm’r, 
    826 F.3d 1200
    , 1203 (9th Cir. 2016)
    (quoting DHL Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 
    285 F.3d 1210
    , 1216 (9th Cir.
    2002). Accordingly, the tax court’s decision may be affirmed on any ground
    supported by the record, even if not relied upon by the tax court. See Cassirer v.
    Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 
    862 F.3d 951
    , 974 (9th Cir. 2017).
    2
    thus the tax court lacked jurisdiction. In particular, West Ventures argues that,
    according to Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), 
    26 U.S.C. §§ 6221
    –6234 (2000), the Commissioner’s FPAA should have been issued
    to Sleiman Ventures (Two) LP (Sleiman Two), which is 90% owned by West
    Ventures. In statutory terms, West Ventures’ argument is that the Loss is a
    “partnership item” of Sleiman Two, not West Ventures. See 
    26 U.S.C. § 6226
    (f)
    (2000) (the tax court has “jurisdiction to determine all partnership items” of the
    partnership to which the FPAA relates).
    Pursuant to TEFRA, a partnership item is one that is “required to be taken
    into account for the partnership’s taxable year under any [income tax] provision”
    and that “is more appropriately determined at the partnership level than at the
    partner level.” 
    26 U.S.C. § 6231
    (a)(3) (2000). When identifying a partnership
    item, “[t]he ‘critical element’ is that the partnership is required to make the
    determination.” Greenwald v. Comm’r, 
    142 T.C. 308
    , 313–314 (2014) (quoting 
    26 C.F.R. § 301.6231
    (a)(3)-1(c)(1)). “Partnership items, such as a partnership’s
    income, gain, loss, deductions, or credits, are items that must be taken into account
    on a partner’s federal income tax return and that are determined by the Treasury
    Secretary to be ‘more appropriately determined at the partnership level than at the
    partner level.’” Candyce Martin 1999 Irrevocable Tr. v. United States, 
    739 F.3d 1204
    , 1210 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (quoting 
    26 U.S.C. § 6231
    (a)(3)
    3
    (2000)). “‘[P]artnership losses . . . are . . . partnership items’ of the partnerships
    that initially reported the losses.” Russian Recovery Fund Ltd. v. United States, 
    101 Fed. Cl. 498
    , 505 (2011) (quoting Sente Inv. Club P’ship v. Comm’r, 
    95 T.C. 243
    ,
    247 (1990)), aff’d, 
    851 F.3d 1253
     (Fed. Cir. 2017). Moreover, “the IRS must
    adjust a partnership item at the partnership level that first produces the loss (or
    gain) in question.” 
    Id.
    Here, it is undisputed that the Loss was first reported in West Ventures’
    Form 1065, and it was not reported in Sleiman Two’s Form 1065 for the 1999 tax
    year. This makes sense, because the Loss was produced by West Ventures’
    redemption of its partnership interest in Sleiman Two. Therefore, the FPAA, to the
    extent it disallowed the Loss, was properly issued to West Ventures, the entity that
    first produced and reported it.
    In Candyce Martin, we specifically rejected West Ventures’ argument in
    analogous circumstances. Analyzing a tax shelter structure almost identical to the
    one at issue here, we observed that “the IRS could have issued an FPAA” to the
    partnership, like West Ventures here, that claimed losses stemming from its
    redemption of interests in another partnership (here, Sleiman Two). 739 F.3d at
    1212. We repeatedly referred to those losses, which were analogous to the Loss, as
    partnership items of the redeeming entity—in this case, West Ventures. Id. at
    1210–12. And we rejected the idea that the losses could have originated with the
    4
    non-reporting partnership, which in this case was Sleiman Two. Id. at
    1213. Accordingly, Candyce Martin establishes that, for the purposes of
    disallowing the Loss, the FPAA was properly issued to West Ventures.
    West Ventures’ secondary argument, that the FPAA was untimely, depends
    on the conclusion that the Loss was not a partnership item of West Ventures. But,
    as described above, we conclude that the Loss was a partnership item of West
    Ventures. Accordingly, without ruling upon the full extent of the scope of the
    Form 872-P agreements extending the Commissioner’s deadline to make
    assessments related to West Ventures, the FPAA was timely here.
    AFFIRMED.
    5