United States v. Dorian Lassen ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         JUL 14 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    19-10086
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
    1:18-cr-00030-JMS-1
    v.
    DORIAN ETSUO LASSEN,                            MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-Appellant.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    19-10107
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
    1:18-cr-00030-JMS-2
    v.
    DAVIN TANAKA,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Hawaii
    J. Michael Seabright, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted July 9, 2020**
    Honolulu, Hawaii
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Before: OWENS, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
    Dorian Lassen and Davin Tanaka appeal from their sentences for conspiracy
    to distribute methamphetamine. We have jurisdiction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    . As
    the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We affirm.
    1.     Lassen argues that the district court abused its discretion when it
    found that Lassen was a “manager” or “supervisor” of the conspiracy, increasing
    his offense level by two under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). A defendant is a manager or
    supervisor only if the defendant “exercised some control over others involved in
    the commission of the offense” or was “responsible for organizing others for the
    purpose of carrying out the crime.” United States v. Mares-Molina, 
    913 F.2d 770
    ,
    773 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
    The record demonstrates that Lassen exercised control over coconspirator
    Joshua Shimoda. Lassen had final decision-making authority over if and when
    Shimoda could sell or retrieve the drugs that Shimoda hid as part of the conspiracy.
    United States v. Varela, 
    993 F.2d 686
    , 691 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
    Beltran, 
    165 F.3d 1266
    , 1271 (9th Cir. 1999). This level of control justified a role
    adjustment under § 3B1.1(c).
    2.     Tanaka argues that the district court erroneously held him responsible
    for the full quantity of drugs found in Shimoda’s possession. In the case of jointly
    undertaken criminal activity, acts of coconspirators count as relevant conduct for
    2                                    19-10086
    sentencing if: (1) the acts were “within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal
    activity,” (2) the acts were “in furtherance of that criminal activity,” and (3) the
    acts were “reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.”
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
    Tanaka argues that the court should have required clear and convincing
    evidence because of the “extremely disproportionate effect” the drug quantity had
    on his sentence. United States v. Hymas, 
    780 F.3d 1285
    , 1289 (9th Cir. 2015)
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, when the defendant
    pleads guilty to conspiracy, and drug quantities are based on the scope of that
    conspiracy, clear and convincing evidence is not necessary. United States v.
    Treadwell, 
    593 F.3d 990
    , 1001 (9th Cir. 2010) overruled on other grounds by
    United States v. Miller, 
    953 F.3d 1095
     (9th Cir. 2020); see also United States v.
    Valle, 
    940 F.3d 473
    , 479 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining that the applicability of the
    clear and convincing standard to sentencing enhancements turns on “the totality of
    circumstances,” including “whether the enhanced sentence negates . . . the
    prosecution’s burden of proof for the crime alleged,” and “whether the increase in
    sentence is based on the extent of a conspiracy” (citation omitted)).
    Tanaka also argues that the district court clearly erred in its factual findings
    holding Tanaka responsible for the drugs. In fact, the record shows that Tanaka
    regularly delivered drugs from Lassen to Shimoda and that all drugs involved in
    3                                     19-10086
    the conspiracy were held in a single storage locker. The district court considered
    each of these factors at sentencing and made the necessary “particularized
    findings” about Tanaka’s responsibility. United States v. Lloyd, 
    807 F.3d 1128
    ,
    1142 (9th Cir. 2015). The district court did not abuse its discretion by holding
    Tanaka responsible for all drugs involved in the conspiracy.
    AFFIRMED.
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