Premier Pools Management Corp. v. Colony Insurance Co. ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 20 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    PREMIER POOLS MANAGEMENT                        No.    18-16551
    CORP.,
    D.C. No. 2:13-cv-02038-JAM-EFB
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    COLONY INSURANCE CO.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted July 15, 2020**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: SILER,*** TALLMAN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
    Premier Pools Management Corporation (“PPMC”) appeals a district court
    order granting summary judgment in favor of Colony Insurance Company
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    (“Colony”), holding that the “law of the case” doctrine did not prevent the court
    from determining whether Colony owed a duty to defend PPMC in a trademark
    infringement lawsuit; finding that Colony owed PPMC no duty to defend; and
    dismissing PPMC’s claims for indemnity, bad faith, and punitive damages. We
    have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . Reviewing de novo, see Street Surfing,
    LLC v. Great Am. E & S Ins. Co., 
    776 F.3d 603
    , 607 (9th Cir. 2014), we affirm.
    The district court properly rejected PPMC’s argument that our prior opinion,
    from a prior appeal in the same litigation, precluded the district court from
    determining whether Colony owed PPMC a duty to defend. Our prior opinion
    makes clear that we previously decided a single, narrow issue: whether PPMC was
    an insured party, and therefore had standing to sue for coverage, under the relevant
    Colony policies. Because we did not consider and decide the separate, broader
    issue of whether Colony owed PPMC a duty to defend, there was no “law of the
    case” on that issue, and the district court was free to decide it. See Mortimer v.
    Baca, 
    594 F.3d 714
    , 720–21 (9th Cir. 2010).
    The district court, on the merits, also correctly rejected PPMC’s argument
    that the underlying trademark infringement lawsuit triggered Colony’s duty to
    defend PPMC for “personal and advertising injury” caused by PPMC’s alleged
    disparagement, use of another’s “advertising idea,” and use of another’s “slogan.”
    PPMC failed to tender the amended complaint containing the relevant, new
    2                                     18-16551
    disparagement allegations, so Colony owed no duty to investigate those allegations
    or to defend PPMC against them, as a matter of law. See Travelers Cas. & Sur.
    Co. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 
    29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 609
    , 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
    And the plaintiff in the trademark infringement lawsuit accused PPMC of
    infringing the company name “Premier Pools,” which the plaintiff repeatedly
    characterized as a trademark—the infringement of which the Colony policies do
    not cover—and not an “advertising idea” or a “slogan.” “Premier Pools” is not an
    “advertising idea” or a “slogan” as a matter of California law. See, e.g., Hyundai
    Motor Am. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 
    600 F.3d 1092
    , 1100
    (9th Cir. 2010) (applying California law) (“[T]he proper test is whether the patents
    at issue involve any process or invention which could reasonably be considered an
    advertising idea.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Street
    Surfing, 776 F.3d at 608–09 (applying California law) (concluding that a “slogan”
    is “a brief attention-getting phrase,” and lack of allegations otherwise suggesting
    that “Street Surfer” was a slogan foreclosed duty to defend for slogan
    infringement). The district court thus correctly granted summary judgment in
    favor of Colony.
    Because Colony owed PPMC no duty to defend, PPMC’s indemnity and
    bad-faith claims fail as a matter of law. See Collin v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 
    26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391
    , 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (“[W]hile an insurer has a duty to defend
    3                                   18-16551
    suits which potentially seek covered damages, it has a duty to indemnify only
    where a judgment has been entered on a theory which is actually (not potentially)
    covered by the policy.”); Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 
    900 P.2d 619
    , 639 (Cal.
    1995) (“[A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due[.]”
    (quoting Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 
    271 Cal. Rptr. 246
    , 256 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990))).
    PPMC’s punitive damages claim fails as well: other than alleging bad faith, PPMC
    does not explain how Colony acted fraudulently, oppressively, or maliciously. See
    
    Cal. Civ. Code § 3294
    . The district court correctly dismissed all three claims.
    Costs are awarded to Colony Insurance Company.
    AFFIRMED.
    4                                   18-16551