R. Abcarian v. Meldon Levine ( 2020 )


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  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    R. ABCARIAN; R. REYES; H. REYES;        No. 19-55129
    J. PETRIE,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,       D.C. No.
    2:16-cv-07106-
    v.                        FMO-JPR
    MELDON EDISES LEVINE; WILLIAM
    WATSON FUNDERBURK, JR.; JILL              OPINION
    BANKS BARAD; MICHAEL F.
    FLEMING; CHRISTINA E. NOONAN;
    DAVID H. WRIGHT; MARCIE L.
    JAMES-KIRBY EDWARDS; JOSEPH A.
    BRAJEVICH; ERIC GARCETTI;
    GILBERT CEDILLO; PAUL
    KREKORIAN; BOB BLUMENFIELD;
    DAVID E. RYU; PAUL KORETZ; NURY
    MARTINEZ; FELIPE FUENTES;
    MARQUEECE HARRIS-DAWSON;
    CURREN D. PRICE; HERB J. WESSON,
    JR.; MIKE BONIN; MITCHELL
    ENGLANDER; MITCH O’FARRELL;
    JOSE HUIZAR; JOE BUSCAINO;
    MICHAEL NELSON FEUER; AND
    JAMES PATRICK CLARK,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding
    2                     ABCARIAN V. LEVINE
    Argued and Submitted October 15, 2019
    Pasadena, California
    Filed August 25, 2020
    Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw and Daniel P. Collins,
    Circuit Judges, and Benjamin H. Settle, * District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge Collins
    SUMMARY **
    Hobbs Act / RICO / Johnson Act
    The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an
    action in which customers claimed that the Los Angeles
    Department of Water and Power overcharged for electric
    power and then transferred the surplus funds to the City of
    Los Angeles, thereby allowing the City to receive what
    amounted to an unlawful tax under California law.
    The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
    plaintiffs’ claim under the Hobbs Act, which imposes
    criminal punishment for the taking of property by extortion.
    Agreeing with other circuits, the panel held that the Hobbs
    Act does not create a civil cause of action.
    *
    The Honorable Benjamin H. Settle, United States District Judge
    for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    ABCARIAN V. LEVINE                       3
    The panel affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ RICO
    claim for reasons different from those given by the district
    court. The panel held that municipal entities are not subject
    to liability under RICO when sued in their official capacities,
    but here the RICO claims were asserted against the
    defendant City and DWP officials in their personal
    capacities. Nonetheless, the RICO claim failed as a matter
    of law because it did not adequately allege a predicate act in
    extortion under California law or the Hobbs Act, mail and
    wire fraud, or obstruction of justice.
    The panel affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims
    under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     on the ground that under the Johnson
    Act, the district court lacked jurisdiction over those claims
    because the rate-setting ordinances at issue were orders
    affecting rates chargeable by a public utility and were made
    by a rule-making body of a State political subdivision.
    Agreeing with the Second Circuit, the panel held that, at least
    where all other federal statutory claims have been dismissed,
    the Johnson Act does not permit a plaintiff to pursue a
    constitutionally based § 1983 claim challenging state or
    local rate orders. In addition, the DPW’s rates did not
    interfere with interstate commerce and were made after
    reasonable notice and hearing, and a plain, speedy and
    efficient remedy could be had in the courts of California.
    COUNSEL
    Marion R. Yagman (argued) and Joseph Reichmann,
    Yagman & Reichmann, Venice Beach, California, for
    Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Michael Martin Walsh (argued), Deputy City Attorney;
    Blithe S. Bock, Managing Assistant City Attorney; Michael
    4                      ABCARIAN V. LEVINE
    N. Feuer, City Attorney; Office of the City Attorney, Los
    Angeles, California; for Defendants-Appellees.
    OPINION
    COLLINS, Circuit Judge:
    Plaintiffs are customers of the Los Angeles Department
    of Water and Power (“DWP”) who claim that DWP
    overcharged for electric power and then transferred the
    surplus funds to the City of Los Angeles (“City”), thereby
    allowing the City to receive what amounts to an unlawful tax
    under California law. 1 Plaintiffs brought suit in federal
    court, asserting claims under the Hobbs Act, the Racketeer
    Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , as well as claims under state law. The
    district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ federal causes of action
    for failure to state a claim, and it declined to retain
    jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. We affirm.
    I
    In reviewing the district court’s dismissal under Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we may consider only “the
    complaint, materials incorporated into the complaint by
    reference, and matters of which the court may take judicial
    notice.” Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc.,
    
    540 F.3d 1049
    , 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). “[W]e take all well-
    pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true,
    1
    Although Plaintiffs allege that DWP overcharged for both water
    and electric power, the operative complaint contains no allegations about
    any comparable transfers involving excess water revenues. Accordingly,
    the claims before us involve only electric power.
    ABCARIAN V. LEVINE                       5
    construing them ‘in the light most favorable to the
    nonmoving party.’” Keates v. Koile, 
    883 F.3d 1228
    , 1234
    (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Silvas v. E*Trade Mortg. Corp.,
    
    514 F.3d 1001
    , 1003 (9th Cir. 2008)). We review de novo
    whether these allegations “‘plausibly give rise to an
    entitlement to relief.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
    
    556 U.S. 662
    , 679 (2009)).
    A
    DWP is governed by a Board of Water and Power
    Commissioners composed of five members who are
    ordinarily appointed by the Mayor with the approval of the
    City Council. See L.A. City Charter §§ 502(a), 670. Under
    the City Charter, the Board fixes the rates to be charged to
    DWP customers for electric power, “[s]ubject to approval by
    ordinance” of the City Council. See id. § 676(a); see also id.
    § 675(b)(3). Any city ordinance, including one approving
    DWP rates, must “be presented to the Mayor for approval
    and signature,” and if the Mayor vetoes the ordinance, the
    Council may override the veto by a prescribed
    supermajority. Id. § 250(b), (c). The Charter provides that
    all revenues collected from the provision of electric power
    service shall be deposited in a “Power Revenue Fund” in the
    City Treasury. Id. § 679(b). These funds may be used only
    for specified purposes, such as costs of operation and
    maintenance, employee benefits, and business promotion.
    Id. § 679(c).
    The Charter provides, however, that if there is a
    “surplus” in the Power Revenue Fund at the end of the City’s
    fiscal year on June 30, then the City Council, acting by
    ordinance and with the consent of the Board, may direct that
    the surplus be transferred to the City Treasury’s Reserve
    Fund. Id. § 344(a), (b); see also id. § 310 (City’s fiscal year
    runs from July 1 through June 30 of the following year). The
    6                      ABCARIAN V. LEVINE
    Reserve Fund may be used for “unanticipated expenditures
    and revenue shortfalls in the City’s General Fund,” id.
    § 302(b); however, with the Mayor’s consent (or a two-
    thirds vote), the City Council may approve a transfer of
    funds from the Reserve Fund to the City’s General Fund, id.
    § 341. See also id. § 679(c)(9) (expressly authorizing
    transfers, under these procedures, from the Power Revenue
    Fund “to the City General Fund”). For purposes of a
    potential transfer, a “surplus” is defined as “the amount
    remaining in the . . . Power Revenue Fund, less outstanding
    demands and liabilities payable out of the fund . . . as shown
    by audited financial statements.” Id. § 344(b)(1). However,
    if the Board concludes that such a transfer would have “a
    material negative impact on [DWP’s] financial condition in
    the year in which the transfer is to be made,” then the Board
    can approve or disapprove the proposed transfer in whole or
    in part. Id. § 344(b)(2), (3).
    At the time that the district court ruled in this case, the
    applicable rates for DWP electric power services were set by
    a combination of two City ordinances, one of which had
    been adopted in 2008, and the other in 2016. The 2016
    ordinance, in turn, completely superseded a prior 2012
    ordinance. All three ordinances were adopted by the City
    Council, and approved by the Mayor, after a series of at least
    three public meetings—one before the Council’s Energy and
    Environment Committee to consider the rates, another
    before the full Council to consider the rates, and a final
    Council meeting to formally approve the ordinance setting
    the rates. 2
    2
    We grant the City’s motion to take judicial notice of the 2008 and
    2016 ordinances and of the official Council File for the 2008, 2012, and
    2016 ordinances. Tollis, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 
    505 F.3d 935
    , 938
    ABCARIAN V. LEVINE                                7
    Since at least 2010, the rates that DWP has charged its
    utility customers for electric power have exceed DWP’s
    costs for providing that service, thereby yielding a surplus at
    the end of the fiscal year. Accordingly, each year over the
    same time period, the City Council, with the approval of the
    Board, has approved a transfer of surplus moneys from the
    Power Revenue Fund to the City’s General Fund. The
    amounts transferred from the Power Revenue Fund have
    ranged from $254 million to $300 million.
    B
    Plaintiffs R. Abcarian, R. Reyes, H. Reyes, and J. Petrie 3
    are individuals who have public utility accounts with DWP
    for the provision of electric power. According to Plaintiffs,
    DWP’s ability to make annual transfers from the Power
    Revenue Fund to the City’s General Fund indicates that the
    electric power rates charged by DWP have consistently
    exceeded its reasonable costs of providing those services.
    Plaintiffs allege that, as a result, the above-cost utility rates
    constituted a “tax” within the meaning of Article XIII C of
    the California Constitution and are therefore subject to the
    voter-approval requirements established in that article. In
    defining what counts as a “tax” that must be approved by
    voters, Article XIII C broadly covers “any levy, charge, or
    n.1 (9th Cir. 2007); Chaker v. Crogan, 
    428 F.3d 1215
    , 1223 n.8 (9th Cir.
    2005); Rabkin v. Dean, 
    856 F. Supp. 543
    , 546 (N.D. Cal. 1994). We
    otherwise deny the motion.
    3
    Neither the initial complaint nor any other document in the record
    sets forth the full names of the Plaintiffs. Because J. Petrie was not added
    as a plaintiff until the filing of the First Amended Complaint, the term
    “Plaintiffs,” as used in this opinion, does not include Petrie when
    referencing procedural actions taken prior to the filing of that amended
    complaint.
    8                   ABCARIAN V. LEVINE
    exaction of any kind imposed by a local government,” except
    for, inter alia, a “charge imposed for a specific government
    service or product provided directly to the payor that is not
    provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed
    the reasonable costs to the local government of providing the
    service or product.” See Cal. Const. art. XIII C, § 1(e)(2)
    (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the City has not
    submitted the relevant electric power rates to the electorate
    for its approval.
    On September 21, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a putative class
    action complaint against various City and DWP officials,
    alleging that DWP “illegally overcharges its customers” for
    electric service and that the defendants were liable to rate-
    payers on a variety of federal and state-law grounds.
    Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction shortly thereafter,
    and Defendants opposed that motion and moved to dismiss
    or stay the action. Defendants’ motion argued, among other
    grounds, that the case should be stayed or dismissed under
    Colorado River Conservation District v. United States,
    
    424 U.S. 800
     (1976), in light of a parallel state court class
    action challenging the legality of the City’s electric rates
    under Article XIII C, see Eck v. City of Los Angeles, No.
    BC577028 (L.A. Super. Ct.). On November 28, 2016, the
    district court stayed this case pending resolution of Eck,
    concluding that Plaintiffs’ action “is essentially a dressed-up
    version of the Eck complaints.” In light of the stay, the
    district court denied Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary
    injunction. Shortly thereafter, the district court denied
    Plaintiffs’ separate motion to enjoin the Eck action. Plaintiff
    appealed these orders, and we affirmed. See Abcarian v.
    Levine, 693 F. App’x 487 (9th Cir. 2017). Our memorandum
    affirming the district court’s orders expressed no view of the
    underlying merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.
    ABCARIAN V. LEVINE                               9
    After the state court subsequently granted preliminary
    approval for a class action settlement in the Eck litigation,
    Plaintiffs successfully moved to lift the stay of this action.
    Plaintiffs thereafter filed the operative First Amended
    Complaint (“FAC”) against the following 27 City officers
    and employees (“Defendants”): the five members of the
    DWP Board; three “operating head[s] of DWP”; DWP’s in-
    house legal counsel; the fifteen members of the City
    Council; the Mayor; and the City Attorney and his chief
    deputy. The FAC asserts nine claims, three of which
    expressly arise under federal law. 4
    First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are personally
    liable under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     in their individual capacities,
    on the theory that the City’s unlawful overcharges deprived
    Plaintiffs of property without due process of law. Second,
    Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are liable for these same due
    process violations under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     in their official
    capacities “pursuant to the principles set forth in Monell v.
    Dep’t of Social Services,” 
    436 U.S. 658
     (1978). Third,
    Plaintiffs assert a claim under the civil action provision of
    RICO, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1964
    . Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that,
    by overcharging for electric power services and threatening
    to terminate service for customers who did not pay,
    Defendants committed multiple “civil RICO predicates,
    including at least fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud, extortion, and
    obstruction of justice.”
    The FAC alleged six additional claims, five of which
    (fraud, conspiracy, conversion, breach of contract, and
    interference with economic relations) rested solely on state
    4
    The FAC actually contains two versions of these nine claims,
    depending upon whether or not Plaintiffs’ challenges to the overcharges
    are found to constitute a challenge to a “rate” order for utility services.
    10                   ABCARIAN V. LEVINE
    law. The last claim, for “extortion,” was expressly “charged
    both as a tort, as a violation of the Hobbs Act, [
    18 U.S.C. § 1951
    ,] and as a RICO predicate” (emphasis added). The
    district court and the parties construed this claim as alleging
    not only a state-law tort claim and a RICO predicate but also
    a direct federal cause of action for a violation of the Hobbs
    Act.
    The district court dismissed the four federal claims with
    prejudice and the state law claims without prejudice.
    Plaintiffs timely appealed.
    II
    We first address Plaintiffs’ assertion of a direct cause of
    action under the Hobbs Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1951
    . That statute
    imposes criminal punishment on:
    Whoever in any way or degree obstructs,
    delays, or affects commerce or the movement
    of any article or commodity in commerce, by
    robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires
    so to do, or commits or threatens physical
    violence to any person or property in
    furtherance of a plan or purpose to do
    anything in violation of this section . . . .
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1951
    (a). Plaintiffs contend that this criminal
    statute creates a private civil right of action in favor of those
    persons from whom property is taken by extortion, and they
    allege that by threatening to turn off Plaintiffs’ utility
    services unless they paid DWP’s unlawful utility rates,
    Defendants have obtained money from Plaintiffs by
    “extortion.” The district court properly dismissed this claim.
    ABCARIAN V. LEVINE                      11
    Prior to its decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 
    532 U.S. 275
     (2001), the Supreme Court “followed a different
    approach to recognizing implied causes of action than it
    follows now.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 
    137 S. Ct. 1843
    , 1855
    (2017). Under this “‘ancien regime,’ the Court assumed it
    to be a proper judicial function to ‘provide such remedies as
    are necessary to make effective’ a statute’s purpose,” and the
    Court routinely implied causes of action “not explicit in the
    statutory text itself.” 
    Id.
     (citations omitted). But the Court
    has now clarified that, “when deciding whether to recognize
    an implied cause of action, the ‘determinative’ question is
    one of statutory intent.” 
    Id.
     at 1855–56 (quoting Sandoval,
    
    532 U.S. at 286
    ). That is, a cause of action may now be
    recognized under a statute only where the language Congress
    used “displays an intent to create not just a private right but
    also a private remedy.” Sandoval, 
    532 U.S. at 286
    . This
    “interpretive inquiry begins with the text and structure of the
    statute and ends once it has become clear that Congress did
    not provide a cause of action.” 
    Id.
     at 288 n.7 (citation
    omitted); see also Northstar Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Schwab
    Invs., 
    615 F.3d 1106
    , 1115 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, if the
    statutory language “itself does not ‘display an intent’ to
    create ‘a private remedy,’ then ‘a cause of action does not
    exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable
    that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the
    statute.’” Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1856 (quoting Sandoval,
    
    532 U.S. at
    286–87) (alteration marks omitted) (emphasis
    added).
    Here, the text of the Hobbs Act merely defines a criminal
    offense and the prescribed punishment for that offense, and
    it contains no “‘rights-creating’ language” manifesting an
    intent to create an accompanying civil private right of action
    for victims of extortion (or anyone else, for that matter).
    Sandoval, 
    532 U.S. at
    288 (citing Cannon v. University of
    12                  ABCARIAN V. LEVINE
    Chicago, 
    441 U.S. 677
    , 690 n.13 (1979)). Indeed, even prior
    to Sandoval, the Supreme Court noted that it “has rarely
    implied a private right of action under a criminal statute, and
    where it has done so ‘there was at least a statutory basis for
    inferring that a civil cause of action of some sort lay in favor
    of someone.’” Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 
    441 U.S. 281
    , 316
    (1979) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 
    422 U.S. 66
    , 79 (1975))
    (emphasis added).
    Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that, as alleged victims of
    Hobbs Act extortion, they are “members of the class for
    whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,” and a cause
    of action in their favor should therefore be implied. But the
    fact that a federal criminal statute protects victims of the
    offense defined by that statute does not, without more, make
    such victims the sort of “‘especial’ beneficiary” who may
    assert an implied private civil cause of action. Logan v. U.S.
    Bank N.A., 
    722 F.3d 1163
    , 1171 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting
    California v. Sierra Club, 
    451 U.S. 287
    , 294 (1981)). As we
    explained in Logan, if being a victim of the offense
    described in a criminal statute were sufficient to assert an
    implied cause of action, then “the victim of any crime would
    be an especial beneficiary of the criminal statute’s
    proscription” who could then assert a civil claim. 
    Id.
    (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has emphatically
    rejected that sweeping view, which “would work a
    significant shift in settled interpretive principles regarding
    implied causes of action.” Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
    First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 
    511 U.S. 164
    , 191
    (1994); see also 
    id.
     at 190–91 (“There would be no logical
    stopping point to this line of reasoning: Every criminal
    statute passed for the benefit of some particular class of
    persons would carry with it a concomitant civil damages
    cause of action.”).
    ABCARIAN V. LEVINE                               13
    Plaintiffs also contend that Congress’s intent to allow
    civil actions under the Hobbs Act is confirmed by the fact
    that Congress expressly included violations of the Hobbs Act
    within the definition of “racketeering activity” for purposes
    of a civil RICO claim. 
    18 U.S.C. § 1961
    (1). On the
    contrary, this fact negates any intention to create a civil
    cause of action directly under the Hobbs Act. The inclusion
    of Hobbs Act violations as predicates for a civil RICO Act
    claim confirms that “when Congress wished to provide a
    private damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did so
    expressly.” Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 
    442 U.S. 560
    ,
    572 (1979). Congress’s failure to include any comparable
    language in the Hobbs Act itself “indicates a deliberate
    congressional choice with which the courts should not
    interfere.” Central Bank, 
    511 U.S. at 184
    .
    We thus agree with our sister circuits that the Hobbs Act
    does not support a private civil right of action, see Eliahu v.
    Jewish Agency for Israel, 
    919 F.3d 709
    , 713 (2d Cir. 2019);
    Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank, of Poplar Bluff, 
    167 F.3d 402
    , 408–09 (8th Cir. 1999), and we affirm the dismissal of
    Plaintiffs’ Hobbs Act claim. 5
    III
    We likewise affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ RICO
    claim, but we do so for reasons different from those given by
    the district court.
    5
    Moreover, as we later explain in connection with Plaintiffs’ RICO
    claim, Plaintiffs have failed to allege “extortion” within the meaning of
    the Hobbs Act. See infra section III(B). Thus, even if the Hobbs Act did
    provide a private right of action, any claim by Plaintiffs under that statute
    would still fail as a matter of law.
    14                  ABCARIAN V. LEVINE
    A
    In dismissing the RICO claim, the district court relied
    primarily on Ninth Circuit precedent holding that municipal
    entities are not subject to liability under RICO. See Pedrina
    v. Chun, 
    97 F.3d 1296
    , 1300 (9th Cir. 1996); Lancaster
    Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 
    940 F.2d 397
    ,
    404 (9th Cir. 1991). While the district court was correct in
    concluding that this rule would necessarily extend to a suit
    against municipal officers in their official capacities, see
    Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles County
    Sheriff Dep’t, 
    533 F.3d 780
    , 799 (9th Cir. 2008) (“An official
    capacity suit against a municipal officer is equivalent to a
    suit against the entity.”), the rule has no application here,
    because Plaintiffs’ RICO claims are asserted against
    Defendants in their personal capacities. The district court
    thought it was sufficient that the FAC relies upon actions that
    Defendants performed within the scope of their official
    duties, but that is wrong. In the context of § 1983 actions,
    for example, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the
    view that a suit against state officials “in their personal
    capacity for actions they take in their official capacity” is
    equivalent to a suit against the state itself. Hafer v. Melo,
    
    502 U.S. 21
    , 27 (1991). We see no reason why a similar
    distinction would not apply here.
    Indeed, our rationale for concluding that civil RICO does
    not apply to municipal entities—that “government entities
    are incapable of forming a malicious intent,” see Lancaster
    Cmty. Hosp., 
    940 F.2d at
    404—is obviously inapplicable to
    natural persons. In invoking this rationale with respect to
    RICO, Lancaster Community Hospital relied heavily on City
    of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 
    453 U.S. 247
     (1981),
    which rejected punitive damages against municipalities
    under § 1983 based in part on contemporaneous
    ABCARIAN V. LEVINE                       15
    “‘respectable authority’ to the effect that municipal
    corporations ‘can not, as such, do a criminal act or a willful
    and malicious wrong and they cannot therefore be made
    liable for exemplary damages.’” City of Newport, 
    453 U.S. at 261
     (quoting Hunt v. City of Boonville, 
    65 Mo. 620
    , 624
    (1877)). Importantly, however, City of Newport emphasized
    that this rationale did not apply to personal-capacity suits
    against municipal officials and that “juries and courts” are
    allowed “to assess punitive damages in appropriate
    circumstances against the offending official, based on his
    personal financial resources.” 
    Id. at 269
    . The express
    distinction drawn by City of Newport further confirms that
    our rule categorically exempting municipalities from civil
    RICO liability does not extend to personal-capacity suits
    against municipal officials acting in their official capacities.
    The district court erred in concluding otherwise.
    B
    Although we thus agree with Plaintiffs that the district
    court’s rationale was legally flawed, we nonetheless
    conclude that the RICO claim was properly dismissed. See
    Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 
    143 F.3d 1293
    , 1295 (9th
    Cir. 1998) (“If support exists in the record, the dismissal may
    be affirmed on any proper ground, even if the district court
    did not reach the issue or relied on different grounds or
    reasoning.”). In our view, Plaintiffs’ RICO claim fails as a
    matter of law because it does not adequately allege a
    cognizable predicate act.
    To state a civil RICO claim under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1964
    (c),
    a plaintiff must allege “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise
    (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity (known as
    ‘predicate acts’) (5) causing injury to the plaintiff’s ‘business
    or property.’” Grimmett v. Brown, 
    75 F.3d 506
    , 510 (9th
    Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs’ FAC relies on four
    16                  ABCARIAN V. LEVINE
    specific crimes that fall within the definition of “racketeering
    activity,” namely, extortion under California law, see
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1961
    (1)(A); extortion under the Hobbs Act, 
    id.
    § 1961(1)(B) (citing 
    18 U.S.C. § 1951
    ); mail fraud and wire
    fraud, 
    id.
     (citing 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1341
    , 1343); and obstruction
    of justice, 
    id.
     (citing 
    18 U.S.C. § 1503
    ). The latter two can
    be readily dismissed. Plaintiffs’ allegations of mail and wire
    fraud rest on the theory that Defendants caused DWP to send
    electric bills that falsely implied that the charges were
    consistent with California law. But especially given the
    open and public process by which the electric rates were set
    and the later transfers were made, Plaintiffs cannot
    repackage the underlying legal dispute under Article XIII C
    of the California Constitution as mail fraud or wire fraud.
    See Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 
    358 F.3d 616
    , 620–22
    (9th Cir. 2004). As for obstruction of justice, the FAC
    contains only a conclusory assertion devoid of factual
    enhancement, which is plainly inadequate. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 678
    .
    Plaintiffs’ remaining         theory—that      Defendants’
    collection of unlawfully high charges for DWP electric
    service amounted to extortion under the Hobbs Act or
    California law—fails as a matter of law under Wilkie v.
    Robbins, 
    551 U.S. 537
     (2007). In Wilkie, the Supreme Court
    held that the Hobbs Act incorporates “the common law
    conception of ‘extortion,’” which drew a sharp “line
    between public and private beneficiaries” in defining what
    counts as “extortion.” 
    Id.
     at 563–64. Because extortion at
    common law “focused on the harm of public corruption, by
    the sale of public favors for private gain,” and “not on the
    harm caused by overzealous efforts to obtain property on
    behalf of the Government,” 
    id. at 564
    , the Court rejected the
    plaintiff’s effort in that case to assert extortion-based civil
    RICO claims against government officials who aggressively
    ABCARIAN V. LEVINE                       17
    sought to obtain an easement for the government from the
    plaintiff, 
    id. at 541, 567
    . Plaintiffs’ RICO claim here
    likewise rests on the theory that Defendants wrongfully
    sought to obtain money for DWP and the City from DWP
    customers, and it therefore fails as a matter of law under
    Wilkie.
    Plaintiffs’ three arguments for evading Wilkie all fail.
    First, Plaintiffs’ theory that Defendants’ ordinary municipal
    compensation supplies the necessary private gain would
    apply to any government official (who is likewise paid by
    the government for which he or she acts) and would simply
    obliterate Wilkie’s clear “line between public and private
    beneficiaries.” 
    551 U.S. at 564
    . Second, Plaintiffs argue
    that, because Wilkie involved federal officials and the federal
    government, its holding does not apply to extortion-based
    civil RICO claims against state and local officials. This
    ignores the Court’s reasoning in Wilkie, which was based on
    the widely accepted common-law understanding of extortion
    by officials generally, and not merely by federal officials.
    
    Id.
     at 564–67. Third, Plaintiffs are wrong in contending that
    Wilkie does not preclude their reliance on California-law
    extortion; on the contrary, Wilkie rejected a similar effort to
    invoke a Wyoming-law predicate in that case. 
    Id. at 567
    . As
    the Court explained, even if the conduct in question is a
    crime punishable by more than one year in prison under state
    law, it cannot serve as a RICO extortion predicate unless it
    satisfies the generic federal definition of extortion. 
    Id.
    (citing Scheidler v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 
    537 U.S. 393
    , 409–10 (2003)). Here, as in Wilkie, “the conduct
    alleged does not fit the traditional definition of extortion, so
    [Plaintiffs’] RICO claim does not survive on a theory of
    state-law derivation.” 
    Id.
    18                     ABCARIAN V. LEVINE
    IV
    We also agree with the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ § 1983
    claims, but our reasoning again differs from the district
    court’s. See Steckman, 143 F.3d at 1295. The district court
    held that these claims failed as a matter of law on their
    merits, but we do not reach that issue because we conclude
    that, under the Johnson Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1342
    , the court
    lacked jurisdiction over these claims. 6
    The Johnson Act provides, in full:
    The district courts shall not enjoin,
    suspend or restrain the operation of, or
    compliance with, any order affecting rates
    chargeable by a public utility and made by a
    State administrative agency or a rate-making
    body of a State political subdivision, where:
    (1) Jurisdiction is based solely on
    diversity of citizenship or repugnance of
    the order to the Federal Constitution; and,
    6
    We reject Plaintiffs’ contention that, having lost on this
    jurisdictional issue below and not having filed a cross-appeal,
    Defendants cannot raise the Johnson Act in this court. Because that Act
    goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, see US West, Inc. v.
    Nelson, 
    146 F.3d 718
    , 721–22 (9th Cir. 1998), it can be raised at any
    stage of the case, and we have an independent obligation to consider it,
    see Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 
    546 U.S. 500
    , 514 (2006). We review this
    issue de novo, considering not just the complaint, but also the evidence
    submitted by the parties in connection with the motion to dismiss under
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See US West, 
    146 F.3d at 721, 724
    .
    ABCARIAN V. LEVINE                             19
    (2) The order does not interfere with
    interstate commerce; and,
    (3) The order has been made after
    reasonable notice and hearing; and,
    (4) A plain, speedy and efficient
    remedy may be had in the courts of such
    State.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1342
    . Even if Plaintiffs are correct that the three
    rate-setting ordinances at issue here violate the California
    Constitution, those ordinances on their face are still “order[s]
    affecting rates chargeable by a public utility” and they were
    “made by . . . a rate-making body of a State political
    subdivision.” 
    Id.
     7 And although the text of the Johnson Act
    mentions only injunctive relief, we have broadly construed
    the statute as “preclud[ing] federal court jurisdiction over all
    suits affecting state-approved utility rates, including actions
    seeking declaratory relief and compensatory damages.”
    Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 
    951 F.2d 1050
    , 1054 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Miller v. N.Y. State Pub.
    Serv. Comm’n, 
    807 F.2d 28
    , 33 (2d Cir. 1986); Tennyson v.
    Gas Serv. Co., 
    506 F.2d 1135
    , 1139 (10th Cir. 1974).
    Accordingly, the Johnson Act deprived the district court of
    subject matter jurisdiction if each of these four conditions is
    7
    Plaintiffs argued below that this aspect of the Johnson Act was not
    satisfied here, because they assertedly challenge only the transfer of the
    surplus funds and not the underlying ordinances setting the electric rates.
    This argument cannot be squared with Plaintiffs’ theory as to the
    underlying illegality of Defendants’ actions, which is that the “charge[s]
    imposed” for electric service “exceed the reasonable costs to the local
    government of providing the service.” CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e)(2)
    (emphasis added).
    20                  ABCARIAN V. LEVINE
    satisfied here. We hold that they are with respect to
    Plaintiffs’ remaining § 1983 claims.
    A
    In light of the dismissal of all of Plaintiffs’ federal
    statutory claims, see supra sections II and III, we conclude
    that jurisdiction here “is based solely on . . . repugnance of
    the order[s] to the Federal Constitution.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1342
    (1).
    As an initial matter, there is no question that Plaintiffs’
    § 1983 claims rest solely on the assertion that Defendants
    have deprived Plaintiffs of property without due process of
    law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See US
    West, 
    146 F.3d at
    723 & n.4 (holding that a § 1983 action
    resting solely on constitutional violations satisfies
    § 1342(1)). Although Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are thus
    “based solely on . . . repugnance of the order[s] to the
    Federal Constitution,” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1342
    (1), the district court
    nonetheless held that the Johnson Act did not apply because,
    in light of the two other federal statutory claims asserted in
    the FAC, jurisdiction over the action did not rest “solely” on
    repugnance to the federal Constitution. In so concluding, the
    district court erred.
    In barring federal courts from exercising “[j]urisdiction”
    to interfere with state rate orders in specified circumstances,
    the text of the Johnson Act necessarily focuses on the
    jurisdictional basis on which the court is asked to grant such
    relief. The happenstance that there may or may not be other
    claims in the case is irrelevant—especially given the fact
    that, in light of the generous rules governing joinder of
    claims, the additional claims asserted in the action may have
    nothing to do with state rate orders at all. See Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 18; 
    id.
     advisory committee’s note to 1937 adoption
    ABCARIAN V. LEVINE                      21
    (noting that Rule 18 was “patterned upon [former] Equity
    Rule 26”). Indeed, the Johnson Act would be a nullity if it
    could be evaded through the simple artifice of adding some
    other federal claim to the complaint.
    But even if the inquiry under the Johnson Act focuses on
    the bases for asserting jurisdiction to grant relief concerning
    the rate orders and not on the complaint as a whole, the fact
    remains that, alongside their constitutionally-based § 1983
    claims, Plaintiffs here did assert federal statutory claims as
    a basis for challenging the rates collected by DWP—namely,
    their Hobbs Act and RICO claims. Although these latter
    claims fail on their merits, jurisdiction over them is not
    barred by the Johnson Act, which “does not apply to claims
    based upon a congressional statute or federal administrative
    rulings, even though these commands are ultimately backed
    up by the Supremacy Clause (and are therefore arguably
    ‘constitutional’ claims).” Public Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Patch,
    
    167 F.3d 15
    , 25 (1st Cir. 1998); see also International Bhd.
    of Elec. Workers v. Public Serv. Comm’n (IBEW), 
    614 F.2d 206
    , 209–11 (9th Cir. 1980) (same). Had those federal
    statutory claims survived, we would then have to confront
    the question whether the Johnson Act should be applied on
    a claim-by-claim basis, such that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the
    rates could proceed with respect to those statutory claims but
    not with respect to the constitutional claims asserted under
    § 1983. Cf. Patch, 
    167 F.3d at 25
     (declining to decide
    whether “the statute permits relief based on constitutional
    claims, even though other claims may support jurisdiction”).
    As explained above, however, those statutory claims have
    not survived. As the case is now configured, the sole
    remaining federal basis for challenging the rate orders is the
    asserted “repugnance of the order[s] to the Federal
    Constitution.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1342
    (1). Were the district court
    now to exercise jurisdiction to enjoin or otherwise interfere
    22                     ABCARIAN V. LEVINE
    with the rate orders, it would be doing precisely what the
    Johnson Act forbids it to do. See IBEW, 
    614 F.2d at 211
    (stating that the purpose of the Johnson Act was to stop
    federal courts from interfering in state rate challenges,
    “‘usually on substantive due process grounds’” (quoting
    Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 
    382 U.S. 111
    , 127 (1965))).
    Accordingly, we agree with the Second Circuit that, at
    least where all other federal statutory claims have been
    dismissed, the Johnson Act does not permit a plaintiff to
    pursue a constitutionally based § 1983 claim challenging
    state or local rate orders. See Evans v. N.Y. State Pub. Serv.
    Comm’n, 
    287 F.3d 43
    , 46–47 (2d Cir. 2002); 8 cf. Hill v.
    Kansas Gas Serv. Co., 
    323 F.3d 858
    , 868–69 (10th Cir.
    2003) (dismissing remaining § 1983 claim on Johnson Act
    grounds after dismissing all other federal claims as “wholly
    insubstantial and frivolous” (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted)).
    We disagree with the district court’s suggestion that this
    approach to the Johnson Act would contravene our
    observation that “[w]e have construed the term ‘solely’ in
    § 1342(1) narrowly.” Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Public Utils.
    Comm’n, 
    827 F.2d 1264
    , 1273 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing IBEW,
    
    614 F.2d at
    210–11). In Hawaiian Telephone and IBEW, the
    defendants sought to bar a federal statutory challenge to state
    rates in federal court on the theory that, because the statute’s
    8
    Because the Second Circuit’s opinion in Evans affirmed the
    Johnson-Act-based dismissal of the § 1983 claims before affirming the
    dismissal of the remaining claims on the merits, see 
    287 F.3d at
    46–47,
    it is arguable that Evans implicitly endorsed the claim-by-claim approach
    to the Johnson Act—i.e., that a constitutional challenge to rates may not
    go forward in federal court even if there are other meritorious federal
    claims. But the Second Circuit ultimately was not presented with the
    latter scenario, and any such implicit view would at best be dicta.
    ABCARIAN V. LEVINE                       23
    preemptive effect ultimately rested on the Supremacy
    Clause, the claim was actually a constitutional one for
    purposes of § 1342(1). Hawaiian Tel., 
    827 F.2d at 1273
    ;
    IBEW, 
    614 F.2d at
    210–11. We concluded that any such
    implicit constitutional underpinning did not detract from the
    fundamentally statutory nature of the challenge and
    therefore that the challenge was not based “solely” on
    repugnance to the federal Constitution. See IBEW, 
    614 F.2d at
    210–11; see also Hawaiian Tel., 
    827 F.2d at 1273
    .
    Because these decisions addressed only the proper
    jurisdictional characterization of a federal statutory claim,
    they had no occasion to address the question whether an
    indisputably constitutional claim may go forward even when
    it is the “sole” claim remaining in the case. Even under a
    narrow construction of “solely,” the solitary federal claim
    remaining in this case is “based solely on . . . repugnance of
    the order[s] to the Federal Constitution.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1342
    (1). See US West, 
    146 F.3d at
    723 & n.4.
    B
    The remaining three enumerated requirements under the
    Johnson Act are all likewise satisfied here.
    Although the DWP’s rates for electrical service to its
    customers may have an effect on interstate commerce, we
    have held that “it is not enough that an intrastate rate-making
    policy merely ‘affect[s]’ interstate commerce.” US West,
    
    146 F.3d at 724
    . Rather, the Johnson Act bars jurisdiction
    unless the challenged orders “interfere with interstate
    commerce.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1342
    (2) (emphasis added).
    Defendants presented evidence confirming that the rates
    here are all for intrastate service, and as a general matter,
    such state or local “orders setting intrastate [utility] rates do
    not interfere with interstate commerce.” US West, 
    146 F.3d at 724
    . In US West, we placed the burden on the plaintiffs to
    24                   ABCARIAN V. LEVINE
    rebut this general presumption that intrastate rate orders do
    not interfere with interstate commerce, and we found that the
    plaintiffs there failed to carry that burden. 
    Id.
     Plaintiffs here
    relied below on evidence showing that DWP obtains
    electricity from out of state and that higher electric rates lead
    to “out-of-state tourists” being “charged higher prices by the
    businesses they patronize,” but these considerations merely
    establish an effect on interstate commerce, not interference.
    Consequently, the Johnson Act’s requirement that the orders
    must not interfere with interstate commerce is satisfied here.
    The official records of the City Council confirm that the
    three rate-setting ordinances at issue were indisputably
    “made after reasonable notice and hearing.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1342
    (3); see supra section I(A). Plaintiffs below made no
    effort to show otherwise.
    Finally, we conclude that a “plain, speedy and efficient
    remedy may be had in the courts” of California. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1342
    (4). In US West, we described this element as
    follows:
    Succinctly put, the state remedy is “plain” as
    long as the remedy is not uncertain or unclear
    from the outset; “speedy” if it does not entail
    a significantly greater delay than a
    corresponding federal procedure; and
    “efficient” if the pursuit of it does not
    generate ineffectual activity or unnecessary
    expenditures of time or energy.
    
    146 F.3d at
    724–25. Given that other DWP customers have
    challenged the same ordinances under Article XIII C in state
    court through the Eck litigation, see supra section I(B), the
    California courts clearly provide for a plain, speedy, and
    ABCARIAN V. LEVINE                     25
    efficient remedy under these standards. US West, 
    146 F.3d at 725
    .
    Because all of the elements of the Johnson Act are
    satisfied here, the district court lacked jurisdiction over
    Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.
    V
    Plaintiffs have provided no basis for concluding that any
    of these deficiencies could be cured by an amendment of the
    complaint, and based upon our own thorough review of the
    record, we agree that amendment would be futile. The
    district court therefore did not err in denying leave to amend
    and in dismissing Plaintiffs’ federal claims with prejudice.
    See Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc.,
    
    368 F.3d 1053
    , 1061 (9th Cir. 2004).
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-55129

Filed Date: 8/25/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/25/2020

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