Tony Hines v. James Dzurenda ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 20 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TONY HINES, No. 21-16682
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00191-APG-DJA
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JAMES DZURENDA; BRIAN WILLIAMS,
Warden; JENNIFER NASH; BEAN,
Warden; JERRY HOWELL, Warden;
TREADWELL; JAMES SCALLY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 14, 2023**
Before: SILVERMAN, SUNG, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Tony Hines appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process and Eighth
Amendment violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
de novo the district court’s ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment.
Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2016). We may affirm on any
basis supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th
Cir. 2008). We affirm.
Summary judgment for Treadwell was proper on Hines’s Eighth
Amendment claim because Hines failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether his placement in segregation for eighteen days constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (setting
forth the requirements for an Eighth Amendment violation in the prison context);
May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (placement in disciplinary
segregation does not violate the Eighth Amendment unless plaintiff shows serious
deprivation and deliberate indifference); Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d
1310, 1312-15 (9th Cir. 1995) (same with administrative segregation).
Summary judgment for Treadwell was proper on Hines’s due process claim
because Hines failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his
placement in segregation implicated a protected liberty interest. See Chappell v.
Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013) (a constitutionally protected
liberty interest implicating an inmate’s due process rights arises only when the
action imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life”); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th
2 21-16682
Cir. 2003) (administrative or disciplinary segregation in and of itself does not
implicate a protected liberty interest).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Hines’s motion for appointment of counsel (Docket Entry No. 26) is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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