Ruthie Henry v. Andrew Saul ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 9 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RUTHIE O.E. HENRY, No. 19-35939
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:18-cv-05583-RBL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 2, 2021**
Seattle, Washington
Before: GRABER, McKEOWN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Ruthie Henry appeals the district court decision affirming the Commissioner
of Social Security’s denial of disability benefits. Reviewing the agency’s
factfinding for substantial evidence, Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(2019), we affirm.
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) performed the five-step analysis and
determined that Henry was not disabled. The ALJ found that Henry would be able
to conduct her past work as an administrative clerk in addition to other jobs
existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Under our deferential
review, if the record could reasonably support either affirming or reversing, we
must affirm. Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 2012).
The ALJ’s evaluation of the medical evidence is supported by substantial
evidence. The conclusion that Henry’s anxiety and depression were non-severe
impairments is supported by the evidence that her symptoms were controlled
effectively with medication. See Warre ex rel. E.T. IV v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that can be controlled
effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining
eligibility for [disability] benefits.”). The conclusion that Henry’s hand tremor,
carpal tunnel syndrome, and bipolar disorder were also non-severe impairments is
supported by the absence of evidence establishing severe impairment during the
relevant period. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (burden
on claimant to establish disability). The limited weight given to Dr. Harrison’s
testimony is supported by the conflict between his testimony and other record
evidence. See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that
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an examining physician’s opinion may be discounted if it is contradicted by other
medical opinions and the ALJ cites specific and legitimate reasons for discounting
it). Finally, though Henry disagrees with the weight given to the non-examining
doctors’ opinions, we are not a factfinder and may not adopt an alternate
interpretation of those opinions, even if it would also be reasonable.
The ALJ’s discounting of Henry’s testimony is supported by substantial
evidence. The ALJ considered Henry’s testimony about her limitations but
ultimately found it to be inconsistent with other evidence, such as her successful
recovery from the heart attack and frequent physical activity including daily walks.
An ALJ may discount a claimant’s testimony when it conflicts with record
evidence. Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir.
2009).
The ALJ’s discounting of the testimony of Henry’s husband, Bart Henry, is
supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ found that his testimony primarily
related to symptoms occurring outside the relevant period. Also, because the
testimony overlaps, some of the reasons given by the ALJ for discounting Henry’s
testimony further support the discounting of Bart Henry’s testimony. See Molina
v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that an ALJ must
give germane reasons for discounting lay testimony and that a failure to do so is
harmless if evidence that the ALJ cited as discrediting other testimony also
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discredits the lay testimony).
The ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment was proper, based on
findings supported by substantial evidence, and free of harmful legal error.
The ALJ’s findings at steps four and five are supported by substantial
evidence. Henry argues that the ALJ erred by posing incomplete hypotheticals to
the vocational expert. But the hypotheticals were incomplete only insofar as we
adopt Henry’s assessment of the facts over the ALJ’s assessment of the facts,
which we cannot do.
AFFIRMED.
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