Darion Edwards v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 9 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DARION EDWARDS, No. 19-15077
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
3:15-cv-05778-VC
v.
ALAMEDA-CONTRA COSTA TRANSIT MEMORANDUM*
DISTRICT, a California public transit
authority, and SALVADOR LLAMAS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Vince Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 14, 2020
San Francisco, California
Before: RAWLINSON and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and MURPHY,**
District Judge.
Appellant Darion Edwards appeals the district court’s imposition of
sanctions against his attorney, Mr. Na’il Benjamin, pursuant to its inherent
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Stephen J. Murphy, III, United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
authority and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for failing “to follow [c]ourt orders and fail[ing] to
keep his client adequately informed of the post-trial proceedings.” The district
court found “not credible” Mr. Benjamin’s explanation “that even though he had
agreed to represent Mr. Edwards through the trial, for some appellate purposes and
in related state court litigation, he had not agreed to represent Mr. Edwards in any
post-judgment proceedings.” The district court noted that “Mr. Benjamin admitted
that he received the [c]ourt’s orders through ECF noticing but argues that he did
not need to review them because judgment had been entered.” The district court
then entered sanctions against Mr. Benjamin in the amount of $805.00 “to
compensate the defendants for . . . the fees defense counsel reasonably incurred in
preparing for and attending” the post-judgment conference that Mr. Benjamin and
his client failed to attend.
“A specific finding of bad faith . . . must ‘precede any sanction under the
court’s inherent powers.’” United States v. Stoneberger, 805 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th
Cir. 1986) (quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980)). Or,
alternatively, a district court must find that counsel willfully disobeyed a court
order. Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015, 1035 (9th Cir. 2012).
Although an inherent powers sanction based on disobedience of a court order does
not require a finding of bad faith, it does require a finding that counsel “acted
deliberately.” Id. The imposition of any sanction under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 must be
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accompanied by a finding that the sanctioned attorney “acted recklessly or in bad
faith” or committed intentional misconduct. Barnd v. City of Tacoma, 664 F.2d
1339, 1343 (9th Cir. 1982).
Here, the district court made no finding that Mr. Benjamin acted recklessly
or in bad faith, that he committed intentional misconduct, or that he willfully
disobeyed a court order. We therefore vacate and remand the case. See Barnd, 664
F.2d at 1343. We note that Mr. Benjamin could benefit from taking responsibility
for his failure to monitor electronic notices in the case after judgment was entered.
We also recommend that, on remand, the district court reconsider whether Mr.
Benjamin’s conduct warranted the imposition of sanctions under applicable
standards.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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