Lord Punchard v. Luna County New Mexico Board O ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 10 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LORD PUNCHARD, AKA Billy Punchard,              No.    19-16385
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 4:19-cv-00159-JGZ
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    LUNA COUNTY NEW MEXICO BOARD
    OF COMMISSIONS; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 3, 2020**
    Before:      MURGUIA, CHRISTEN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
    Lord Punchard AKA Billy Punchard appeals pro se from the district court’s
    judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims related to
    alleged mining leases. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review
    de novo. CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 
    653 F.3d 1066
    , 1073 (9th Cir.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2011) (dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)); Libas Ltd. v.
    Carrillo, 
    329 F.3d 1128
    , 1130 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal under Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Punchard’s claims against defendants
    State of New Mexico, Grisham, Martinez, Luna County Board of Commissions,
    and Deming City Council because Punchard failed to allege facts sufficient to
    make a prima facie showing that the district court had personal jurisdiction over
    these defendants. See CollegeSource, Inc., 
    653 F.3d at 1074-80
     (discussing
    requirements for general and specific personal jurisdiction). As to the State of
    New Mexico, dismissal of Punchard’s claims was also proper because the claims
    are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 
    473 U.S. 159
    , 169 n.17 (1985) (“§ 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State’s Eleventh
    Amendment immunity”).
    The district court properly dismissed Punchard’s claim against the Bureau of
    Land Management because Punchard failed to allege facts sufficient to state a
    plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 
    627 F.3d 338
    , 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010)
    (although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present
    factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Ashcroft
    v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (a plaintiff must allege facts that “allow[] the
    court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
    2                                     19-16385
    misconduct alleged”).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Punchard’s motion
    for recusal because Punchard failed to demonstrate extrajudicial bias or prejudice.
    See 
    28 U.S.C. § 144
     (requirements for recusal), § 455 (circumstances requiring
    disqualification); United States v. Hernandez, 
    109 F.3d 1450
    , 1453-54 (9th Cir.
    1997) (standard of review; under § 144 and § 455, the substantive standard for
    recusal is whether “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would
    conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” (citation
    and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Punchard’s motion
    for preliminary injunction because Punchard failed to demonstrate that he was
    likely to succeed on the merits of his claims. See Jackson v. City & County of San
    Francisco, 
    746 F.3d 953
    , 958 (9th Cir. 2014) (plaintiff must establish that he is
    likely to succeed on the merits, likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
    preliminary relief, the balance of equities tips in his favor, and an injunction is in
    the public interest).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Punchard’s motion
    for default judgment because the Clerk never entered a default. See Eitel v.
    McCool, 
    782 F.2d 1470
    , 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (standard of review and factors
    for entry of default judgment).
    3                                     19-16385
    Punchard’s motion to expedite is denied as moot.
    AFFIRMED.
    4                 19-16385