Hector Espino Solorio v. William Barr ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 25 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HECTOR JAVIER ESPINO SOLORIO, No. 18-72636
Petitioner, Agency No. A098-584-628
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted September 3, 2020
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and CALDWELL,** District
Judge.
Petitioner Hector Javier Espino Solorio petitions for review of an order by
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s
(“IJ”) denial of his motion to terminate removal proceedings and his application
for cancellation of removal, and denial of his motion to remand. We review factual
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Karen K. Caldwell, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
findings for substantial evidence and legal conclusions de novo. Azanor v.
Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004).
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s finding that Petitioner’s conviction for a drug
offense made him removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), and that his
conviction did not qualify for that provision’s “personal use exception” to
removability. The BIA did not err in so finding because the circumstance-specific
approach applies to section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)’s exception to removability, and the
record establishes that the circumstances of Petitioner’s conviction disqualify him
for the exception. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 33-39 (2009).
Further, this Court has no jurisdiction to review the merits of the BIA’s
decision to affirm the IJ’s discretionary denial of Petitioner’s application for
cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Szonyi v. Whitaker, 915 F.3d
1228, 1258 (9th Cir. 2019).
Finally, the BIA did not err by denying Petitioner’s motion to remand
because the record establishes that Petitioner did not present previously
unavailable, material evidence, as the applicable regulation requires. See Angov v.
Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2015); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).
PETITION DENIED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART.
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