Juan Vazquez v. E. Conannan ( 2023 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 23 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JUAN R. VÁZQUEZ,                                No.    21-16731
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
    1:19-cv-00045-DAD-SAB
    v.
    E. CONANNAN; et al.,                            MEMORANDUM*
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 22, 2023**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Juan Vázquez appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for
    California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation employees Dr. Conanan,
    Dr. Kamen, nurses Silveira and Van Blargen, and physician assistants Siegrist and
    Hitchman (Defendants). We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    de novo the district court’s summary judgment. Toguchi v. Chung, 
    391 F.3d 1051
    ,
    1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
    Vázquez alleges that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference in
    violation of the Eighth Amendment while he was an inmate at Avenal State Prison.
    Defendants, all medical practitioners, attended to Vázquez between late 2015 and
    early 2016 related to his repeated complaints of pain in his feet and heels. Due to
    former nerve injuries, Vázquez has mobility limitations and chronic pain and made
    multiple requests for a wheelchair so that he could put less pressure on his feet. After
    examinations, consultations, interviews, and observations of Vázquez—including
    Vázquez’s admission that he jumps rope and their observations thereof—medical
    doctors Kamen and Conanan determined that a wheelchair was not presently
    medically indicated, and rescinded Vázquez’s wheelchair accommodation. Nurses
    Van Blargen and Silveira and physician assistants Siegrist and Hitchman agreed
    from their multiple visits with Vázquez. They treated his wounds with sterilization
    and dressing, advised him to keep his feet clean and dry, and thought no further
    action was necessary. When podiatrist Dr. Zorilla evaluated Vázquez in February
    2016, he recommended that Vázquez be issued a walker, and Siegrist agreed;
    Vázquez was issued a walker in late February 2016.
    Vázquez sued Defendants under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , arguing that Defendants
    acted with deliberate indifference because they failed to respond reasonably to his
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    requests by not granting him access to a wheelchair until late February, allegedly
    causing his wounds to worsen during that time and subjecting him to the unnecessary
    and wanton infliction of pain. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
    findings and recommendations that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be
    granted as it agreed that Vázquez had failed to establish deliberate indifference,
    holding that the undisputed evidence established that Defendants did act reasonably
    and made their medical decisions in good faith. Vázquez asks us to overturn the
    summary judgment, arguing that the district court did not view the facts in the light
    most favorable to Vázquez.
    While Vázquez is correct that, at the summary judgment stage, the court must
    view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Vázquez may not
    rest on his pleadings. Banks v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
    870 F.2d 1438
    , 1441 (9th Cir.
    1989). He must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
    Bator v. State of Hawai’i, 
    39 F.3d 1021
    , 1026 (9th Cir. 1994). Vázquez has not.
    To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment,
    a plaintiff must establish two facts: (1) the existence of a serious medical need, and
    (2) that the defendants’ “response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett v.
    Penner, 
    439 F.3d 1091
    , 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). The second part requires a showing
    that the defendants “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health
    and safety.” Toguchi, 
    391 F.3d at 1057
    . A mere “‘difference of medical opinion’
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    as to the need to pursue one course of treatment over another [is] insufficient, as a
    matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 
    90 F.3d 330
    , 332 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled in part on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard,
    
    744 F.3d 1076
     (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). A plaintiff must show that the treatment
    “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” and was chosen “in
    conscious disregard of an excessive risk” to the plaintiff’s health. Hamby v.
    Hammond, 
    821 F.3d 1085
    , 1092 (9th Cir. 2016).
    Although Vázquez may have established a serious medical need, the
    undisputed evidence shows that all Defendants did not disregard an excessive risk
    to his health and safety, and provided adequate medical treatment. Defendants
    conducted numerous physical exams reasonably quickly after Vázquez requested
    them, had interviews with Vázquez to ensure he received fair treatment, made
    referrals for specialized care, and treated his injuries according to acceptable
    industry standards. It was in Defendants’ professional judgment that a wheelchair
    was not medically necessary.
    While Vázquez may have disagreed, a patient’s difference of medical opinion
    concerning the appropriate course of treatment is not sufficient to constitute
    deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 
    891 F.2d 240
    , 242 (9th Cir. 1989). In
    addition, a difference of medical opinion among doctors about how to treat a patient
    is also insufficient to establish deliberate indifference, so long as the chosen
    4
    treatment was not medically unacceptable. Toguchi, 
    391 F.3d at 1058
    . Here, the
    undisputed evidence shows that Defendants’ course of treatment for Vázquez—
    providing attentive wound care, constantly evaluating and observing him, and
    referring him to a specialist—was anything but unacceptable. Further, when in
    Defendants’ professional opinions, a walker was deemed medically necessary for
    Vázquez, Defendants issued one. Vázquez has not demonstrated any genuine
    dispute of these facts.
    AFFIRMED.
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