Wanda Nelson v. Santa Barbara Cty Sheriff's ( 2021 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 12 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    WANDA NELSON,                                   No.    19-56324
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
    2:18-cv-10218-JFW-PLA
    v.
    SANTA BARBARA COUNTY SHERIFF'S                  MEMORANDUM*
    OFFICE; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    and
    DOES, Santa Barbara County Sheriffs
    Office Doe Deputies 1-5 and Santa Barbara
    County Doe Deputy District Attorneys 6-
    20,
    Defendant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 10, 2021**
    Pasadena, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Before: TALLMAN, CALLAHAN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
    Wanda Nelson was a caregiver for Heidi Good, who was dependent on a
    ventilator to breathe. When the ventilator became disconnected and Heidi died,
    Nelson was indicted by a grand jury for murder. After a jury acquitted her of the
    murder charges and her conviction for manslaughter was reversed on appeal,
    Nelson brought this 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action against the prosecuting attorneys and
    the county agents who had investigated the crime and prosecuted her. The district
    court denied Nelson an extension of time in which to conduct discovery and
    granted summary judgment for the defendants. Nelson filed a timely notice of
    appeal. Nelson has not shown that additional discovery would have precluded
    summary judgment or that there are any outstanding material issues of fact.
    Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed.1
    1. Nelson has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in
    denying her an extension of time in which to conduct discovery. The denial of a
    Rule 56(d) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Maloney v. T3Media, Inc.,
    
    853 F.3d 1004
    , 1009 (9th Cir. 2017). To demonstrate an abuse, Nelson must show
    that she diligently pursued her discovery opportunities and that allowing additional
    discovery would have precluded summary judgment. Panatronic USA v. AT&T
    1
    Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we restate only those
    necessary to explain our decision.
    2
    Corp., 
    287 F.3d 840
    , 846 (9th Cir. 2002). It does not appear that additional
    discovery would have altered the district court’s grounds for granting summary
    judgment. Therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her
    Rule 56(d) motion.
    2. Nelson has not shown that there is any outstanding material issue of fact
    on her Brady claims. A Brady claim requires, at a minimum, the suppression of
    favorable evidence from the defense at trial that harmed the accused. See Mellen v.
    Winn, 
    900 F.3d 1085
    , 1096 (9th Cir. 2018). Nelson alleged Brady violations for
    materials concerning: (a) Heidi’s fear of her husband who had grown tired of the
    financial burden of her care; (b) the ventilator hose on Heidi’s respiratory machine
    becoming disconnected; (c) Nelson’s routine practice of leaving Heidi in Heidi’s
    mother’s care when Nelson ran errands; and (d) prior problems with the
    refrigeration units which housed Heidi’s body. The district court found that
    materials concerning the first two areas, although not disclosed to the grand jury,
    were disclosed and presented at trial. It found that information concerning the
    refrigeration units was not available until trial and was presented by the defense at
    trial. The district court found that Nelson was fully aware of her practice of
    leaving Heidi to run errands outside the home and, thus, there was no Brady
    violation. Nelson’s Brady claims fail because although she argues that certain
    materials should have been presented to the grand jury, she does not deny that the
    3
    information was available to her at trial. See United States. v. Williams, 
    504 U.S. 36
    , 53 (1992) (holding that under federal law, the government is not required to
    present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury).
    3. Nelson has not shown that there is a material issue of fact on her
    fabrication of evidence claim. In order to show fabrication based on circumstantial
    evidence, Nelson must show either that the defendants continued their
    investigation despite the fact that they knew or should have known she was
    innocent, or that defendants used investigative techniques that were so coercive
    and abusive that they were likely to yield false information. Devereaux v. Abbey,
    
    263 F.3d 1070
    , 1076 (9th Cir. 2001). The California Court of Appeal found that it
    was reasonable for the defendants to suspect Nelson. See People v. Nelson, No.
    B290806, 
    2019 WL 2206207
     (Cal. Ct. App. May 22, 2019). Nelson cites the
    differences between Dr. Hawley’s testimony before the grand jury and his
    testimony at trial, as well as Dr. Anthony’s assertion that he was pressured to
    change his view of the cause of death. But even viewing these allegations in a
    light most favorable to Nelson, they do not show that defendants used coercive or
    abusive investigative techniques that were likely to create unreliable information.
    4. Nelson has not shown that there is a material issue of fact concerning her
    claims that the defendants failed to investigate other suspects. These claims
    require a demonstration of an agreement or meeting of minds to violate her
    4
    constitutional rights. Crowe v. County of San Diego, 
    608 F.3d 406
    , 440 (9th Cir.
    2010). Nelson claims that she was denied equal protection because she is African-
    American. However, the record shows that Heidi’s husband was not considered a
    suspect because he was not home at the time of her death. It also shows that the
    investigation did not focus solely on Nelson, as both Nelson and Heidi’s mother
    were indicted for the homicide. The record shows that it was reasonable for the
    defendants to suspect Nelson. See Nelson, 
    2019 WL 2206207
    .
    5. Nelson has not shown that there is a material issue of fact concerning her
    claim of conspiracy. To establish a claim of conspiracy Nelson had to demonstrate
    the existence of an agreement or meeting of minds. See Crowe, 606 F.3d at 440.
    As noted, the record shows that Heidi’s death was suspicious, and that Nelson was
    a suspect, but there is nothing in the record to suggest that defendants prosecuted
    Nelson because of her race.
    6. Finally, as we affirm the award of summary judgment on Nelson’s claims
    against the individual defendants, we also affirm the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment against Nelson on her Monell claims against the Santa Barbara
    County Sheriff’s Office and the Santa Barbara County District Attorney’s Office.
    See Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 
    697 F.3d 1059
    , 1070 (9th Cir. 2012).
    5
    The district court’s grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED.2
    2
    Because we affirm the district court’s decision on its merits, we do not
    address the defendants’ claims for immunity.
    6