United States v. Juan Matta-Ballesteros ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 12 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 20-50129
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. Nos.
2:88-cr-00129-JAK-1
v. 2:88-cr-00129-JAK
JUAN RAMON MATTA-BALLESTEROS,
AKA Don Jose, AKA Matta, AKA Jairo MEMORANDUM*
Rios Vallejo,
Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 20-50130
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. Nos.
2:85-cr-00606-JAK-1
v. 2:85-cr-00606-JAK
JUAN RAMON MATTA-BALLESTEROS,
AKA Don Jose, AKA Matta, AKA Jairo
Rios Vallejo,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Submitted February 10, 2021**
Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH, MURGUIA, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Juan Matta-Ballesteros (Matta) appeals from the district court’s denial of his
motion for compassionate release. The district court determined that 18 U.S.C.
§ 4205(g), rather than 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), applies to Matta because the offenses
for which he was convicted occurred prior to November 1, 1987. Because
§ 4205(g) allows compassionate release only upon motion by the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP), the district court denied Matta’s motion. As the parties are familiar
with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we affirm.
This appeal hinges on which of two statutory provisions governing
compassionate release applies to Matta. Section 3582(c)(1)(A), as recently
amended by the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194,
5239 (2018), allows courts to reduce a term of imprisonment either upon motion of
the BOP or the defendant, whichever is earlier. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Section 4205(g), however, allows such modifications only upon motion of the
BOP. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g).
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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Congress replaced § 4205(g) with § 3582(c) in the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 (SRA), Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 227, 98 Stat. 1837, 1998 (1984). As initially
passed, the SRA was to “take effect on the first day of the first calendar month
beginning twenty-four months after the date of enactment,” save for a few
exceptions inapplicable here. SRA, § 235, 98 Stat. at 2031. Congress then
changed the delay period from twenty-four to thirty-six months from the date of
enactment. See Sentencing Reform Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-217
§ 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985). Soon after, Congress added clarifying language that the
SRA “shall apply only to offenses committed after the taking effect of this
chapter.” Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182 § 2(a), 101 Stat. 1266(1987). In sum, “18 U.S.C. 4205(g) was repealed effective November 1, 1987, but
remains the controlling law for inmates whose offenses occurred prior to that date
[(“old law” defendants)]. For inmates whose offenses occurred on or after
November 1, 1987 [(“new law” defendants)], the applicable statute is 18 U.S.C.
3582(c)(1)(A).” 28 C.F.R. § 572.40.
The First Step Act did not change this two-track regime when it amended the
language of § 3582(c). As amended, § 3582(c)(1) reads: “In any case[,] the court,
upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the
defendant . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1).
Matta seizes on the words “in any case,” arguing that the plain text of the statute
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indicates § 3582(c)(1) should now apply to all inmates. But the words “in any
case” were not added by the First Step Act; they were present in the SRA as
originally enacted. See SRA, 98 Stat. at 1998.
“[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at
least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it
according to its terms.” Schroeder v. United States, 793 F.3d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir.
2015) (citation omitted). Affording new law defendants greater access to
compassionate release does not rise to the level of absurdity that would justify
overwriting a clearly written statute. That inmates in Matta’s position—serving
non-parolable sentences for pre-1987 offenses—are not eligible for compassionate
release because the BOP declines to initiate compassionate release for them may
be “harsh,” but it is not the product of an absurd statutory scheme, and therefore
does not empower us to “rewrite the statute that Congress has enacted.” Dodd v.
United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005).
Matta contends § 3582(c)(1)(A) should apply to him because Congress’s
sole intent in making the statute non-retroactive was to avoid ex post facto
problems with respect to other sections of the SRA. “Even those . . . who
sometimes consult legislative history will never allow it to be used to ‘muddy’ the
meaning of ‘clear statutory language.’” Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media,
139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019) (citation omitted). The statutory text here is clear
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and its straightforward application to Matta does not frustrate Congress’s apparent
intent.
Finally, Matta argues that Congress impliedly repealed the SRA’s non-
retroactivity provision in passing the First Step Act. “[W]hen two statutes are
capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed
congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.” Maine Cmty.
Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1323 (2020) (citation omitted)
(alteration in original). Though the First Step Act was intended in part to expand
access to compassionate release, Matta points to no “clearly expressed
congressional intent[],” id., in the First Step Act to repeal the non-retroactivity
provision of the SRA.
Therefore, § 4205(g) applies to Matta. Because the BOP did not initiate his
motion for compassionate release, the district court correctly denied it.
AFFIRMED.
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