Tracey Randall v. Andrew Saul ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 12 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TRACEY K. RANDALL, No. 19-35984
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:18-cv-05966-RAJ
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 3, 2021**
Seattle, Washington
Before: GRABER, McKEOWN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Tracey Randall appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the Social
Security Commissioner’s denial of his application for Supplemental Security
Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381–83. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s
judgment affirming the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of social
security benefits, “and will disturb the denial of benefits only if the decision
‘contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.’” Ford v. Saul,
950 F.3d 1141, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). We will not reverse an
ALJ’s decision for harmless error, which exists “when it is clear from the record
that the ALJ’s error was ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability
determination.’” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
1. The ALJ properly evaluated the medical evidence. First, the ALJ properly
found that the treating psychologists’ opinions were inconsistent with Randall’s
mental–status examination results and range of activities. Thus, the ALJ
discounted their opinions for “specific and legitimate” reasons that are supported
by substantial evidence in the record. See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154–56; Ghanim v.
Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2014). The ALJ’s failure to discuss Dr.
Wingate’s 2008 opinion was harmless error because this opinion was entirely
consistent with her other opinions, which were duly considered. See Molina v.
Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2012).
Second, where the opinions of the state agency medical consultants were
consistent with the objective medical findings of record, the ALJ’s decision to give
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“great weight” to their opinions was supported by substantial evidence. See Shaibi
v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2017) as amended (Feb. 28, 2018)
(finding no legal error where there was no “obvious inconsistency” between a
medical opinion and the ALJ’s findings). These findings included mild
degenerative changes to the spine, no neurologic motor deficits, normal gait,
overall conservative treatment with no surgery, positive results from pain
medication, and Randall’s reported range of activities.
Third, the ALJ did not err in his consideration of evidence from medical
providers who did not state an opinion regarding Randall’s limitations. The
evidence that Randall offers from these other medical providers is consistent with
the ALJ’s findings. See id. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination
as to these medical providers. See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154.
2. The ALJ properly evaluated the “other source” evidence from mental health
counselor Bill Wilson. The ALJ considered the counselor’s assessment and, in
determining Randall’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ included some
limitations from that assessment. In light of the record as a whole, the counselor’s
notes do not show that Randall’s limitations were more severe. See Shinseki v.
Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (“[T]he burden of showing that an error is
harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.”).
Substantial evidence thus supports the ALJ’s assessment. See Ford, 950 F.3d at
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1154.
3. The ALJ properly discredited some of Randall’s testimony about his
symptoms and limitations. Randall’s allegations of physical and mental symptoms
were inconsistent with the record medical findings. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(4).
Improvement with conservative treatment is a convincing reason to discount an
allegation of disabling symptoms; conservative measures like medication
controlled Randall’s symptoms well. See Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2016); Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1040. And “an ALJ
may consider any work activity, including part-time work, in determining whether
a claimant is disabled.” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1156. Randall’s activities during the
relevant period undermined his allegations. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113; Drouin
v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 1992). Substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s determination that Randall was more able and active than he asserted. See
Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154.
4. The ALJ properly discounted the statements of Randall’s long-term partner
Julie Wilson. Her statements, which echoed Randall’s testimony, were
inconsistent with the objective medical evidence. Substantial evidence thus
supports the ALJ’s decision to give her statements “minimal weight.”
5. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s residual functional capacity and
step-five findings, which included Randall’s credible limitations. In the
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hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert, the ALJ properly included
only those limitations found credible and supported by substantial evidence in the
record. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2008).
AFFIRMED.
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