United States v. Daniel Nix ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAY 12 2020
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 18-30242
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                D.C. No.
    2:17-cr-00105-RSL-1
    v.
    DANIEL A. NIX,                                   MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 4, 2020**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: KLEINFELD, W. FLETCHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
    Daniel Nix appeals his jury conviction for attempted evasion of payment of
    taxes. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    In 1997, Nix stopped paying federal taxes on his interior design consulting
    business. Although his business earned nearly $2 million in profit over the next
    sixteen years, Nix voluntarily paid only $744 in federal taxes. During this time,
    Nix submitted false tax returns stating that he had no income and mailed fictitious
    money orders to the IRS.
    The government charged Nix with thirteen counts of attempted tax evasion,
    26 U.S.C. § 7201, eleven counts of presenting fictitious financial obligations, 18
    U.S.C. § 514, and one count of corrupt interference with the Internal Revenue
    Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7212. A jury convicted Nix on all twenty-five counts.
    Nix appeals only his convictions for attempted tax evasion, and only on the
    ground that the government failed to prove that he acted willfully. Nix claims he
    could not have acted willfully because he had a good-faith belief that the federal
    government had no authority to tax him, a “sovereign citizen.”
    We review whether the district court erred in denying Nix’s non-renewed
    motion for judgment of acquittal for “manifest miscarriage of justice or for plain
    error.” United States v. Kuball, 
    976 F.2d 529
    , 531 (9th Cir. 1992); see also United
    States v. Maggi, 
    598 F.3d 1073
    , 1080 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010). However, we would
    affirm even if we were to review de novo.
    2
    First, “a defendant’s views about the validity of the tax statutes are irrelevant
    to the issue of willfulness[.]” Cheek v. United States, 
    498 U.S. 192
    , 206 (1991).
    Nix, like the defendant in Cheek, had “full knowledge of the [tax] provisions at
    issue and a studied conclusion, however wrong, that those provisions are invalid
    and unenforceable.”
    Id. at 205.
    Such taxpayers are “in no position to claim that
    [their] good-faith belief about the validity of the Internal Revenue Code negates
    willfulness or provides a defense to a criminal prosecution under [26 U.S.C.
    §] 7201[.]”
    Id. at 206.
    Nix’s defense thus fails as a matter of law. The evidence overwhelmingly
    showed that Nix knew about his tax obligations and chose not to comply. To
    prove willfulness, the government had to show that the “law imposed a duty on the
    defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and
    intentionally violated that duty.”
    Id. at 201;
    see also United States v. Powell, 
    955 F.2d 1206
    , 1211 (9th Cir. 1991). At trial, the government presented evidence that
    Nix received multiple notices from the IRS, emailed his bookkeeper about his “IRS
    issues,” met with IRS auditors only to file for restraining orders against them, filed
    false tax returns, and submitted fictitious money orders to the IRS. Nix disputes
    none of these facts on appeal. Given this evidence, “any reasonable trier of fact
    3
    could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    
    Kuball, 976 F.2d at 531
    .
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-30242

Filed Date: 5/12/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/12/2020