Dawood Dawood Abdalla v. William Barr ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 12 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DAWOOD AHMED DAWOOD                             No.    19-70035
    ABDALLA, et al.,
    Agency Nos.       A208-444-354
    Petitioners,                                      A208-444-355
    A209-049-652
    v.                                                               A209-049-654
    A209-049-655
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,                                A209-049-656
    A209-049-657
    Respondent.
    MEMORANDUM*
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted May 8, 2020**
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: WATFORD and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and BATTAGLIA,***
    District Judge.
    Dawood Ahmed Dawood Abdalla, his wife Jehad Hussein Mansour Abu
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Anthony J. Battaglia, United States District Judge for
    the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
    Page 2 of 3
    Hmaid, and their five children (“Petitioners”), citizens of Jordan, petition for review
    of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing their appeal
    from the order of an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying an application for asylum and
    withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).1 We
    have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and deny the petition.
    We review the administrative findings of fact for substantial evidence. Zetino
    v. Holder, 
    622 F.3d 1007
    , 1012 (9th Cir. 2010). “Under this standard, the petition
    for review must be denied if the BIA’s determination is ‘supported by reasonable,
    substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’”
    Id. (quoting INS
    v. Elias–Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 (1992)).
    The Attorney General may grant asylum to a “refugee.” 8 U.S.C.
    § 1158(b)(1)(A); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a). A “refugee” is an individual who is
    “unable or unwilling to return to” his or her country “because of persecution or a
    well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
    membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.
    § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). The applicant must establish either past
    persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a statutorily-
    1
    The children are derivatives of their parents’ applications for asylum, see 8
    U.S.C.§ 1158(b)(3)(A), (B); 8 C.F.R.§ 1208.21(a), (c), but there is no derivative
    status for withholding of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16;
    see also Chand v. INS, 
    222 F.3d 1066
    , 1069 n.2, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2000).
    Page 3 of 3
    protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1), (2). An application for asylum is
    deemed to constitute an application for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C.
    § 1231(b)(3)(A). See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.3(b); see also INS v. Stevic, 
    467 U.S. 407
    , 420
    n.13 (1984). The standard for withholding of removal is more stringent than the well-
    founded fear standard for asylum, so an applicant who fails to establish his or her
    eligibility for asylum necessarily fails to establish eligibility for withholding of
    removal. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 
    453 F.3d 1182
    , 1190 (9th Cir. 2006); Farah v.
    Ashcroft, 
    348 F.3d 1153
    , 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
    There is substantial evidence in the record to support the agency’s
    determination that Petitioners failed to meet their burden of proof for asylum and
    withholding of removal. The evidence provided by Petitioners regarding past
    persecution—not having been able to secure government jobs that afforded better
    pay and benefits, being rejected from the Jordanian military, various and unrelated
    physical altercations, and paying higher tariffs—simply do not rise to the extreme
    level of persecution. See Gormley v. Ashcroft, 
    364 F.3d 1172
    , 1177–78 (9th Cir.
    2004). Petitioners also failed to establish the requisite individualized risk of future
    persecution in the country, as they only presented evidence that they were members
    of a disfavored group in Jordan. See Wakkary v. Holder, 
    558 F.3d 1049
    , 1065 (9th
    Cir. 2009).
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.