Virginia Hamm v. Andrew Saul ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 13 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    VIRGINIA E. HAMM,                               No.    17-17341
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:16-cv-01098-NVW
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
    Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 11, 2020**
    Before:      GOODWIN, SCHROEDER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Virginia E. Hamm appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
    Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Hamm’s application for disability
    insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the
    Social Security Act (Act). We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and 42
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo, Molina v. Astrue, 
    674 F.3d 1104
    , 1110 (9th
    Cir. 2012), and we affirm.
    1.    The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) did not harmfully err in evaluating
    the medical evidence. First, the ALJ provided “specific and legitimate reasons that
    are supported by substantial evidence” for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Bagley,
    Hamm’s treating physician. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 
    871 F.3d 664
    , 675 (9th Cir. 2017)
    (quoting Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    528 F.3d 1194
    , 1198 (9th Cir. 2008)). For
    example, the ALJ rejected Dr. Bagley’s opinion because it was unsupported by
    objective evidence, was inconsistent with the record as a whole, and demonstrated
    a lack of understanding of social security disability programs and evidentiary
    requirements. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 
    533 F.3d 1035
    , 1041 (9th Cir. 2008)
    (“incongruity” between physician’s opinion and his treatment notes was a specific
    and legitimate reason to reject the opinion); Thomas v. Barnhart, 
    278 F.3d 947
    ,
    957 (9th Cir. 2002) (ALJ need not accept an opinion that is “inadequately
    supported by clinical findings”); see also 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (c) (providing that
    consistency with the record as a whole, supportability, and understanding of
    disability programs are factors to consider in evaluating medical opinions).
    Therefore, even assuming the other reasons proffered by the ALJ for rejecting Dr.
    Bagley’s opinions were erroneous, any error would be “inconsequential to the
    ultimate nondisability determination,” because the ALJ offered specific and
    2                                     17-17341
    legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinions. See Molina, 
    674 F.3d at 1115
    (quoting Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    533 F.3d 1155
    , 1162 (9th Cir.
    2008)).
    Second, the ALJ did not err in assigning significant weight to the opinion of
    Dr. Metcalf, a nonexamining medical advisor, because the ALJ properly
    considered the requisite factors and explained how they weighed in favor of Dr.
    Metcalf’s opinion. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (c) (listing factors ALJ should
    consider in weighing medical opinions, including consistency with the record as a
    whole); Thomas, 
    278 F.3d at 957
     (“The opinions of non-treating or non-examining
    physicians may also serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent
    with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record.”).
    2.    The ALJ did not harmfully err in discounting Hamm’s testimony, because
    the ALJ offered “specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Trevizo, 871
    F.3d at 678 (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 
    759 F.3d 995
    , 1015 (9th Cir. 2014)).
    Indeed, the ALJ provided several specific, clear and convincing reasons supported
    by substantial evidence for discounting Hamm’s testimony, including: (1) Hamm’s
    testimony was inconsistent with, and unsupported by, the medical evidence of
    record, see Carmickle, 
    533 F.3d at 1161
     (ALJ may discount a claimant’s testimony
    as inconsistent with the medical evidence); Burch v. Barnhart, 
    400 F.3d 676
    , 681
    (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ may consider a lack of corroborating medical evidence as one
    3                                   17-17341
    factor in the credibility determination); (2) Hamm’s “poor effort” on physical
    examinations suggested Hamm exaggerated her symptoms, see Thomas, 
    278 F.3d at 959
     (finding the claimant’s lack of effort during two examinations undermined
    claimant’s credibility); and (3) Hamm’s work history also undermined the
    credibility of her testimony, see Bruton v. Massanari, 
    268 F.3d 824
    , 828 (9th Cir.
    2001) (recognizing an ALJ properly discounted claimant’s testimony where the
    claimant left work because “he was laid off, rather than because he was injured”).
    Therefore, even assuming the ALJ’s other proffered reasons for discounting
    Hamm’s testimony were erroneous, any such error was harmless, because the ALJ
    offered other specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting Hamm’s
    testimony. See Molina, 
    674 F.3d at 1115
    .
    AFFIRMED.
    4                                   17-17341