United States v. Eddie Houston, Jr. ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 22 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 20-10043
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:07-cr-00109-TLN-1
v.
EDDIE HOUSTON, Jr., MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 14, 2020**
Portland, Oregon
Before: BYBEE and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and CHHABRIA,*** District
Judge.
Mr. Eddie Houston, Jr. appeals the district court’s order denying his motion
for a sentence reduction under section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Vince Chhabria, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231 and we have jurisdiction on appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the
district court’s denial of Houston’s motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) for
abuse of discretion and any underlying questions of law de novo. See United States
v. Chaney, 581 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) (reviewing discretionary denials of
sentence reduction motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion).
Abuse of discretion includes applying the incorrect law or relying on a clearly
erroneous finding of material fact. Id. The district court did not abuse its discretion,
and we affirm.
Houston argues that the district court’s order misstated the law in finding him
ineligible under the First Step Act, and abused its discretion by failing to consider
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and his related arguments. Houston’s contention
that the district court deemed him ineligible for a sentence reduction under the First
Step Act is based on a misreading of the district court’s order. While not as clear as
it could have been, the district court did not deem Houston ineligible for a sentence
reduction. If that had been the basis for the court’s decision, then there would have
been no reason for the court to explain that Houston’s current sentence is “well-
supported” and “falls within the modified statutory penalty range and at the low end
of the applicable guideline range.” Nor would the district court have exercised its
discretion to “decline[] to reduce” Houston’s sentence; it would have simply denied
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his request as a matter of law. What the district court did was presume without
deciding Houston’s eligibility, stating that the “plain language of the [First Step Act]
suggests that the Court may reduce Defendant’s sentence.” It then exercised its
discretion to “decline[] to reduce” further Houston’s sentence.
We follow the district court’s approach, and assume without deciding that
Houston is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. Assuming
Houston was eligible, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting his
request for a further sentence reduction. The district court denied Houston’s motion
principally on the grounds that retroactively applying the Fair Sentencing Act to his
offense did not counsel for a further decrease in a sentence that was already “well-
supported” and within the statutory guideline ranges. Houston argues on appeal that
the district court was required to “provide a sufficient explanation” for rejecting his
specific contention that he merited a reduced sentence based on the section 3553(a)
factors (regarding his troubled childhood and current age), his post-conviction
record of rehabilitation, and his release plan. See United States v. Trujillo, 713 F.3d
1003, 1009–11 (9th Cir. 2013) (requiring some consideration of section 3553(a)
factors for motions under section 3582(c)(2)).
But Houston brought his motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B), which
omits the requirement that courts consider section 3553(a) factors in modifying
sentences. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) (no requirement to consider the
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section 3553(a) factors) with id. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (requiring consideration of
section 3553(a) factors) and id. § 3582(c)(2) (same). Thus, the district court was not
required to consider the section 3553(a) factors here.
Four years after granting a previous sentence reduction, the district court
reasonably declined to find Houston merited a further decrease, even assuming the
First Step Act applies. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Houston a further sentence reduction of a sentence that is already “well-supported”
under the First Step Act.1
AFFIRMED.
1
Houston’s motion to remand this case to a different district court judge is denied
as moot.
4