David Roberts v. Andrew Saul ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 9 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVID R. ROBERTS, No. 18-35559
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:17-cv-05544-MAT
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Mary Alice Theiler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 1, 2020**
Seattle, Washington
Before: BYBEE and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and STEARNS,*** District Judge.
Petitioner David R. Roberts appeals the denial of his application for
disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income. The district court
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge for
the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A district court’s order affirming, reversing, or
modifying the denial of disability insurance benefits is reviewed de novo.” Mayes
v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 2001). “This court may set aside the
Commissioner [of Social Security]’s denial of benefits when the [Administrative
Law Judge, or] ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d
1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001). We affirm.
1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of Roberts’s treating
physician’s medical records. “The medical opinion of a claimant’s treating
physician is given ‘controlling weight’ so long as it ‘is well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.”
Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2)). Here, Roberts’s treating physician did not provide an opinion
about Roberts’s functional limitations. She did, however, record several clinical
observations and diagnoses over the course of several visits with Roberts.
Contrary to Roberts’s argument, the ALJ did not reject the treating physician’s
observations and diagnoses, including a diagnosis of depression. Rather, the ALJ
acknowledged the depression diagnosis and, pointing to several parts of the record,
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determined that Roberts’s depression did not rise to the level of a severe mental
impairment. The ALJ’s interpretation of the treating physician’s medical records
was not unreasonable.
2. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinions of
Roberts’s examining physicians. “An ALJ is not required to take medical opinions
at face value, but may take into account the quality of the explanation when
determining how much weight to give a medical opinion.” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d
1141, 1155 (9th Cir. 2020). First, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision
to give great weight to the opinion of the examining physician whom Roberts
visited the day before his disability onset date, who documented a comprehensive
physical examination and who recorded observations consistent with his
conclusions as well as other clinical observations and testimony in the record.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4) (“Generally, the more consistent a
medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that
medical opinion.”). Moreover, the ALJ accounted for later-produced MRI
evidence (which the examining physician could not have reviewed) by finding
Roberts even more physically limited than had the examining physician. Second,
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to give lesser weight to the
opinion of a physical examiner and second individual of disputed identity who
produced a Physical Functional Evaluation for the Washington State Department
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of Social and Health Services (DSHS). Ford, 950 F.3d at 1155. Here, the ALJ
noted that the DSHS report contained relatively limited explanations and
documentation to support its conclusions, and lacked any documented observations
concerning Roberts’s gait. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3) (“The
more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support a medical opinion,
particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give
that medical opinion. The better an explanation a source provides for a medical
opinion, the more weight we will give that medical opinion.”); 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4). The ALJ also identified specific reasons why he
deemed the other examining physician’s examination more consistent with others
in the record. The ALJ’s evaluation was not unreasonable.
3. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to
the opinion of a non-examining physician who reviewed the DSHS report. In
general, “the opinion of an examining physician is entitled to greater weight than
the opinion of a nonexamining physician.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d
1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). “The weight afforded a non-examining physician’s
testimony depends ‘on the degree to which they provide supporting explanations
for their opinions.’” Id. at 1201 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)) (current
version at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3)). Here, the ALJ noted that the non-
examining physician based his conclusions on an evaluative report which the ALJ
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reasonably assessed as relatively incomplete. Further, the ALJ noted that the non-
examining physician’s opinion regarding the maximum weight that Roberts could
carry was expressly contradicted by Roberts’s own testimony. The ALJ’s decision
to attribute lesser weight to the non-examining physician’s opinion was not
unreasonable.
4. The ALJ did not err in evaluating the medical findings of two
orthopedists who did not provide opinions about Roberts’s functional limitations.
Roberts’s presentation of alternative interpretations of these physicians’ clinical
observations and diagnoses does not render the ALJ’s assessment of the medical
evidence unreasonable.
5. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to find Roberts’s
testimony regarding the severity of his impairments only partially credible. When
evaluating a claimant’s testimony, an ALJ first “must determine whether the
claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment
which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms
alleged.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d at 678. If this step is satisfied, absent
evidence of malingering, “the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the
severity of [his] symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons
for doing so.” Id. “General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify
what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s
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complaints.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, the ALJ
identified specific instances where Roberts’s allegations of functional limitations
conflicted with medical evidence in the record and other evidence of Roberts’s
lived activities, and outlined how aspects of Roberts’s testimony were
unsupported. The ALJ’s credibility determination was not legal error, nor
unreasonable.
6. Roberts’s other arguments rely on his arguments that the ALJ erred in
weighing the medical evidence and discrediting his testimony. The ALJ did not
unreasonably weigh Roberts’s testimony and the medical evidence; as a result,
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determinations with regards to Roberts’s
impairments, residual functional capacity, and job availability.
AFFIRMED.
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