Edwin Hardeman v. Monsanto Company ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 28 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EDWIN HARDEMAN, No. 19-16253
19-16255
Plaintiff-Appellant,
D.C. Nos. 3:16-cv-00525-VC
v.
3:16-md-02741-VC
MONSANTO COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee. MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Vince Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 23, 2020**
San Francisco, California
Before: HAWKINS, N.R. SMITH, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Edwin Hardeman appeals the district court’s imposition of
sanctions of $500.00 each against his attorneys Aimee Wagstaff and Jennifer
Moore. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the
sanctions imposed on Wagstaff and reverse the sanctions imposed on Moore.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here.
We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s imposition of
sanctions under its inherent power. Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115
F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997). “[A] district court abuses its discretion when it
makes an error of law, when it rests its decision on clearly erroneous findings of
fact, or when we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court
committed a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069,
1086 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (cleaned up). “[T]he district court’s findings of
fact, and its application of those findings of fact to the correct legal standard,” are
clearly erroneous if they “were illogical, implausible, or without support in
inferences that may be drawn from facts in the record.” United States v. Hinkson,
585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
1. Wagstaff
The district court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Wagstaff due to
at least three acts during her opening statements cited in its sanctions order.1 First,
Wagstaff “spoke to the jury about what Phase 2 of the trial would involve, despite
a clear understanding among the parties that this would be off limits.” Second, she
violated the district court’s “pretrial ruling strictly limiting the evidence that would
1
We do not address the other two acts listed in the sanctions order because the
three acts discussed below were sufficient to show that sanctions were not an abuse
of discretion.
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be admissible about IARC during Phase 1.” Third, she “violated the Court’s
bifurcation order and its pretrial evidentiary ruling limiting evidence about the
EPA’s analysis of glyphosate.” The district court did not abuse its discretion by
inferring bad faith from Wagstaff’s recklessness in the first act and her violations
of pretrial orders in the second and third acts. See Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989,
994 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding sanctions can be imposed for recklessness “coupled
with an improper purpose”); Miller v. City of Los Angeles, 661 F.3d 1024, 1029
(9th Cir. 2011) (holding it is “permissible to infer bad faith” from a violation of an
order “plus the surrounding circumstances”). We affirm the sanctions imposed on
Wagstaff.
2. Moore
The district court’s order sanctioning Moore was an abuse of discretion.
First, the district court did not find that Moore was reckless or that she directly
violated its pretrial orders. Rather, it ascribed Wagstaff’s misconduct to Moore,
who did not exert supervisory authority over Wagstaff. According to the court,
Moore “intentionally joined” in Wagstaff’s bad-faith misconduct. But Wagstaff
claimed all responsibility for the opening statement and stated that “no one had the
authority to edit, delete, or add phase 1 slides without [her] permission.” The
district court did not cite any fact showing that Moore, not Wagstaff, violated its
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orders. Accordingly, the district court’s order did not meet the “high threshold” of
bad faith. See Primus, 115 F.3d at 649.
Furthermore, the district court did not adequately explain how it inferred
Moore’s bad faith intent to violate its pretrial rulings from the other attorneys’
letters responding to the show-cause order. The letters uniformly expressed a
desire to abide by the pretrial evidentiary rulings, supporting an inference of good
faith attempts at compliance. The district court’s finding that Moore went
“forward with an opening statement that . . . violated . . . pretrial rulings,” without
more explanation, is “without support” and an abuse of discretion. See Hinkson,
585 F.3d at 1251.
Because the district court did not specifically find that Moore was reckless
or that she committed direct violations of pretrial orders, and because it inferred
bad faith intent without support, sanctions against Moore were an abuse of
discretion. We reverse the district court’s order imposing sanctions of $500.00 on
Moore.
AFFIRMED AS TO WAGSTAFF. REVERSED AS TO MOORE.
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