United States v. Aubrey Taylor ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                                 FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    NOV 4 2020
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        Nos. 19-30105
    19-30162
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                                              2:16-cr-00300-RSL-1
    AUBREY TAYLOR, AKA Uno,
    MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted October 6, 2020
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: GRABER and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and FREUDENTHAL,**
    District Judge.
    Defendant Aubrey Taylor timely appeals his convictions for one count of
    conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking of a minor, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1591
    (a)(1) and 1594(c) (Count One); one count of sex trafficking of a minor
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Nancy D. Freudenthal, United States District Judge for
    the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
    through force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1591
    (a)(1), (b)(1),
    and (b)(2) (Count Two); and three counts of sex trafficking of an adult by force,
    fraud, or coercion in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1591
    (a)(1) and (b)(1) (Counts Three,
    Four, and Five). We affirm in part, vacate the convictions on Counts 1 and 2, and
    remand.
    1. We review de novo the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to
    suppress the contents of his cell phone and whether the government’s delay in
    seeking a warrant to search the phone was constitutionally reasonable. United
    States v. Dass, 
    849 F.2d 414
    , 415 (9th Cir. 1988). The district court incorrectly
    denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. Considering the totality of the
    circumstances, the government’s 14-month delay in obtaining a warrant to search
    the phone was unjustifiably long and constitutionally unreasonable. United States
    v. Sullivan, 
    797 F.3d 623
    , 633 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Song Ja Cha, 
    597 F.3d 995
    , 1000 (9th Cir. 2010).
    The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to Counts One and
    Two, which involved H.S., the minor victim. The government repeatedly
    emphasized a text message Defendant sent from the phone at issue to argue that he
    knew or recklessly disregarded H.S.’s age. Other evidence supporting Defendant’s
    knowledge or reckless disregard of H.S.’s age was fairly weak. Therefore, reversal
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    of Defendant’s convictions for sex trafficking of a minor through force, fraud, and
    coercion and for conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking of a minor is required.
    Neder v. United States, 
    527 U.S. 1
    , 7 (1999).
    2. We review de novo whether Defendant voluntarily waived his rights
    under Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966), and for clear error whether the
    waiver was knowing and intelligent. United States v. Cazares, 
    121 F.3d 1241
    ,
    1243 (9th Cir. 1997). The district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress
    his statement made while he was in the hospital was proper. Considering the
    totality of the circumstances, Defendant waived his Miranda rights voluntarily,
    even though he was in the hospital and on medication at the time. United States v.
    George, 
    987 F.2d 1428
    , 1430–31 (9th Cir. 1993).
    3. There was no plain error in qualifying the FBI agent as an expert. United
    States v. Mendoza-Paz, 
    286 F.3d 1104
    , 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2002). The expert
    witness, who was sufficiently qualified, described her professional experience with
    pimps; she did not discuss the facts of the case. United States v. Bighead, 
    128 F.3d 1329
    , 1330 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). Additionally, the witness did not opine
    on an ultimate legal issue and thus did not impinge on the jury’s function.
    Hangarter v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 
    373 F.3d 998
    , 1017 (9th Cir.
    2004) (“a witness may properly be called upon to aid the jury in understanding the
    3
    facts in evidence even though reference to those facts is couched in legal terms”
    (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Convictions on Counts One and Two VACATED. Convictions on
    Counts Three, Four, and Five AFFIRMED. REMANDED for re-sentencing.
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