United States v. William Waller ( 2020 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        NOV 12 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         No.   19-10367
    Plaintiff-Appellee,              D.C. No.
    2:18-cr-00112-JCM-VCF-1
    v.
    WILLIAM WALLER,                                   MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted October 14, 2020**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: FERNANDEZ, WARDLAW, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
    William Waller appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for acquittal
    on two counts of willful failure to file a tax return under 
    26 U.S.C. § 7203
     and one
    count of attempt to evade or defeat tax under 
    26 U.S.C. § 7201
    . We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Panel
    1.   The district court correctly concluded that venue was proper in
    Nevada for the failure to file charges. “Failure to file a tax return is an offense
    either at the defendant’s place of residence, or at the collection point where the
    return should have been filed.” United States v. Hicks, 
    947 F.2d 1356
    , 1361 (9th
    Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). This is true even if the defendant is required to file
    his return in a state in which he does not reside. 
    Id.
     The Nevada venue was proper
    because Waller resided in Nevada.
    2.   The district court properly concluded that sufficient evidence
    supported the attempted tax evasion conviction, even though Waller did not
    receive a notice of tax deficiency for the relevant years. “The elements of
    attempted income tax evasion under 
    26 U.S.C. § 7201
     are: (1) willfulness; (2) the
    existence of a tax deficiency; and (3) an affirmative act constituting an evasion or
    attempted evasion of the tax.” United States v. Kayser, 
    488 F.3d 1070
    , 1073 (9th
    Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). To prove willfulness, the government must show that
    the “law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty,
    and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.” Cheek v. United
    States, 
    498 U.S. 192
    , 201 (1991). “A tax deficiency exists from the date a return is
    due to be filed” and is not dependent on a final assessment by or notice of
    deficiency from the IRS. United States v. Voorhies, 
    658 F.2d 710
    , 714 (9th Cir.
    1981); see also 
    26 U.S.C. § 6151
    (a). There was sufficient evidence for the jury to
    Panel                                      2
    conclude that Waller knew of his deficiency and intentionally violated his duty to
    pay tax: Waller’s real estate brokerage provided him with 1099 Forms; he had paid
    income tax previously; and he had been penalized for filing a “zero” return in the
    past.
    3.   The district court did not abuse its discretion by not admitting into
    evidence two video clips of former IRS agents discussing tax law because the
    probative value of the videos was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. The
    video evidence was “repetitive, only marginally relevant,” and “pose[d] an undue
    risk of . . . confusion of the issues.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 
    547 U.S. 319
    , 326–
    27 (2006) (cleaned up). Because Waller was able to “present the substance” of his
    defense by testifying to the contents of the videos and how they affected his
    subjective state of mind, the district court’s evidentiary ruling achieved the proper
    balance under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and did not violate Waller’s
    constitutional rights. United States v. Waters, 
    627 F.3d 345
    , 353–54 (9th Cir.
    2010); see also United States v. Bergman, 
    813 F.2d 1027
    , 1029–30 (9th Cir. 1987);
    United States v. Malquist, 
    791 F.2d 1399
    , 1402 (9th Cir. 1986).
    4.   The district court properly rejected Waller’s requested entrapment by
    estoppel instruction because there was no “foundation in the evidence” for the
    instruction. United States v. Whittemore, 
    776 F.3d 1074
    , 1078 (9th Cir. 2015)
    (citation omitted). To succeed under an entrapment by estoppel theory, the
    Panel                                     3
    defendant “must show that (1) an authorized government official, empowered to
    render the claimed erroneous advice, (2) who has been made aware of all the
    relevant historical facts, (3) affirmatively told [the defendant] the proscribed
    conduct was permissible, (4) that [the defendant] relied on the false information,
    and (5) that [the] reliance was reasonable.” United States v. Schafer, 
    625 F.3d 629
    ,
    637 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Batterjee, 
    361 F.3d 1210
    , 1216 (9th
    Cir. 2004)). Waller claimed to have relied on internal IRS records, obtained
    through a Freedom of Information Act request, which included a computerized
    code that read “Mail File Requirement: 01= Return not required to be mailed or
    filed. (1040 not required).” The district court correctly found that single line was
    too vague to qualify as the affirmative statement required to establish entrapment
    by estoppel. See United States v. Ramirez-Valencia, 
    202 F.3d 1106
    , 1109 (9th Cir.
    2000) (“To succeed under [the entrapment by estoppel] theory, defendant must do
    more than show that the government made vague or even contradictory
    statements.”) (cleaned up).
    AFFIRMED.
    Panel                                      4