Fareed Sepehry-Fard v. Santa Clara County Court ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       NOV 16 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FAREED SEPEHRY-FARD,                            No. 18-17286
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 5:18-cv-02665-BLF
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    SANTA CLARA COUNTY COURT; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Beth Labson Freeman, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted November 9, 2020**
    Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
    Fareed Sepehry-Fard appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
    dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim
    and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Serra v. Lappin, 
    600 F.3d 1191
    , 1195
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Sepehry-Fard’s claims against
    defendants Herrick and Rada in their official capacities, and the Superior Court of
    California, County of Santa Clara (erroneously sued as Santa Clara County Court),
    because the claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst State
    Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 
    456 U.S. 89
    , 100 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment
    immunity applies to states and their agencies or departments “regardless of the
    nature of the relief sought”); Simmons v. Sacramento Cty. Superior Court, 
    318 F.3d 1156
    , 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (California state courts are “arms of the state”
    entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
    Servs., 
    436 U.S. 658
    , 690 n.55 (1978) (official capacity suits are “another way of
    pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent”).
    The district court properly dismissed Sepehry-Fard’s federal claims against
    Herrick and Rada in their individual capacities because Sepehry-Fard failed to
    allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 
    627 F.3d 338
    ,
    341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, plaintiff
    must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see
    also West v. Atkins, 
    487 U.S. 42
    , 48 (1988) (elements of a § 1983 claim); Lindsey
    v. SLT L.A., LLC, 
    447 F.3d 1138
    , 1145 (9th Cir. 2006) (elements of a § 1981 claim
    outside of an employment context); Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 
    425 F.3d 1158
    ,
    2                                     18-17286
    1168-69 (9th Cir. 2005) (the absence of a deprivation of rights under § 1983
    precludes a § 1985(3) claim premised on the same allegations); Trerice v.
    Pedersen, 
    769 F.2d 1398
    , 1403 (9th Cir. 1985) (no cause of action under § 1986
    absent a valid § 1985 claim); St. Michael’s Convalescent Hosp. v. California, 
    643 F.2d 1369
    , 1373 (9th Cir. 1981) (Freedom of Information Act does not apply to
    state agencies or bodies).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Sepehry-Fard’s
    California Public Records Act claim against Herrick and Rada in their individual
    capacities because Sepehry-Fard failed to state a federal claim. See Ove v. Gwinn,
    
    264 F.3d 817
    , 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (standard of review; court may decline
    supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims once it has dismissed all
    claims over which it has original jurisdiction).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Sepehry-Fard’s
    first amended complaint without leave to amend because amendment would have
    been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 
    656 F.3d 1034
    , 1041
    (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal
    without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sepehry-Fard’s
    motion for reconsideration because Sepehry-Fard failed to demonstrate any basis
    for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 
    5 F.3d 3
                                        18-17286
    1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for
    reconsideration).
    We reject as without merit Sepehry-Fard’s contentions of misconduct on the
    part of appellees’ counsel.
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    All pending motions and requests, including those set forth in appellant’s
    opening and reply briefs, are denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    4                                       18-17286