Juan Thompson v. Andrew Saul ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       NOV 19 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JUAN THOMPSON,                                  No.    19-35893
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00105-RJB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
    Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted November 16, 2020**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: GOULD and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and BOUGH,*** District
    Judge.
    Juan Diangelo Thompson appeals the district court’s affirmance of the
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.
    Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance
    benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and supplemental security income
    under Title XVI of the Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42
    U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo, Attmore v. Colvin, 
    827 F.3d 872
    , 875 (9th
    Cir. 2016), and we affirm.
    The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) was required to provide specific and
    legitimate reasons for discounting the opinions of the examining providers. Lester
    v. Chater, 
    81 F.3d 821
    , 830 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ properly evaluated the
    longitudinal medical evidence and the medical opinion evidence and provided
    specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence to discount the
    opinions of the three examining providers, Dr. McDuffee, Dr. Anderson, and Dr.
    Harmon. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 
    871 F.3d 664
    , 675 (9th Cir. 2017).
    The ALJ reasonably concluded that these opinions were inconsistent with
    Thompson’s record of improvement when he was compliant with taking his
    medication. The ALJ’s conclusion about these inconsistencies was further
    supported by her finding that treatment notes contemporaneous to Thompson’s
    examination by Dr. Anderson indicate that Thompson’s symptoms—particularly
    his difficulty getting along well with others and handling difficult situations—were
    well-controlled when he took his medication. Thompson’s argument that he was
    compliant during the periods of these three examinations is unavailing because the
    2
    record does not conclusively show he was compliant with taking his medications at
    the time of each exam, and the record demonstrated that Thompson had a history
    of noncompliance during the relevant time period. Additionally, the ALJ
    determined that Thompson was an unreliable witness and an unreliable historian
    due to numerous inconsistencies in his testimony and throughout the record, and
    Thompson does not dispute this credibility finding on appeal.
    The ALJ’s conclusion that the providers’ opinions were inconsistent with
    Thompson’s records from individual and group therapy sessions was supported by
    substantial evidence. The ALJ recounted that Thompson frequently presented to
    sessions with a pleasant, cooperative attitude, euthymic mood, logical thought
    processes, intact cognitive function, good eye contact, and numerous other indicia
    of mental status findings within a normal range. These findings were in conflict
    with the examining providers’ reports of, for example, his tangential thought
    processes and aggressive manner. Contrary to Thompson’s assertion, the ALJ
    made her findings while also acknowledging the presence of abnormal findings in
    the longitudinal record as well, such as times when Thompson presented with
    depressed, anxious, or irritable mood. The ALJ is responsible for resolving such
    ambiguities in the record, and “[w]e must uphold the ALJ’s decision [even when]
    the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Magallanes
    v. Bowen, 
    881 F.2d 747
    , 750 (9th Cir. 1989).
    3
    Similarly, the ALJ did not err when she concluded that the three examining
    opinions were inconsistent with records from Thompson’s group therapy notes,
    which revealed that Thompson was cooperative, pleasant, respectful, attentive,
    polite, and receptive to others’ comments during sessions, in contrast to the three
    examiners’ conclusions that Thompson would be unable to get along with others in
    workplace settings. See Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    613 F.3d 1217
    , 1224 (9th
    Cir. 2010).
    The ALJ’s conclusion that Thompson’s symptoms were in part responsive to
    situational stress was also based on substantial evidence. The ALJ detailed
    numerous examples between 2012 and 2017 in which Thompson experienced
    difficult situations or was noncompliant with treatment, resulting in an impact on
    his symptoms. The ALJ’s conclusion that this evidence in the record was
    inconsistent with the examiners’ conclusions was specific and legitimate, and
    supported by substantial evidence.
    The ALJ did not err by giving little weight to the providers’ opinions
    because they relied in part on Thompson’s self-reporting, which the ALJ found to
    be unreliable due to multiple inconsistencies throughout the record. See
    id. at 1223.
    Thompson does not dispute these inconsistencies, nor does he challenge the
    ALJ’s finding that he was not a reliable witness or historian of his own symptoms.
    Contrary to Thompson’s argument, the ALJ noted that the three opinions relied
    4
    only “in part” on self-reporting, thereby acknowledging that the examining
    providers also relied on their own clinical observations and objective testing.
    The ALJ’s additional reasons for giving little weight to Dr. Anderson and
    Dr. McDuffee’s opinions were also based on substantial evidence. The ALJ
    provided a specific and legitimate reason for giving little weight to Dr. McDuffee’s
    opinion because Dr. McDuffee’s conclusions contradicted the results of her own
    mini-mental status exam. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 
    427 F.3d 1211
    , 1216 (9th Cir.
    2005). The ALJ rejected Dr. Anderson’s opinion for the additional reasons that
    Thompson made statements to Dr. Anderson that were inconsistent with his self-
    reported psychiatric history elsewhere in the record to which Dr. Anderson did not
    have access, and that Thompson presented with far more controlled symptoms at
    treatment appointments that were contemporaneous with Dr. Anderson’s exam .
    These were specific and legitimate reasons for giving little weight to Dr.
    Anderson’s opinion. See 
    Turner, 613 F.3d at 1223
    .
    AFFIRMED.
    5