United States v. Anthony Jones, Jr. ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FEB 24 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-10322
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
4:18-cr-00032-JAS-EJM-1
v.
ANTHONY DELBERT JONES, Jr., MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
James Alan Soto, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 4, 2021
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: W. FLETCHER, MILLER, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Anthony Delbert Jones, Jr., entered a conditional plea of guilty to
possessing a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and
924(a)(2). He reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Any cross-certification error is excused under the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. “When evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in
a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.” Illinois
v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987). However, when police “act with an objectively
‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct is lawful,” the exclusionary rule
does not apply because the underlying deterrence rationale fails and exclusion is
not justified. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011) (citation omitted)
(collecting cases). Here, based on Sheriff Napier’s letter, Agent Bullock
reasonably believed he was cross-certified under Arizona law and that he had the
power to make the traffic stop. The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
thus applies, and there is no basis to exclude the evidence.
Even if we were to assume the stop violated the Appropriations Clause and
the Purpose Act, suppression would not be an appropriate remedy in this case. See
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (“Suppression of evidence . . . has
always been our last resort, not our first impulse.”); see also Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 347 (2006) (“[T]he exclusionary rule is not a remedy we
apply lightly.”); United States v. Dreyer, 804 F.3d 1266, 1278 (9th Cir. 2015) (en
banc) (“[W]e recognize that all three cases reflect the Supreme Court’s recent
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direction that the [exclusionary] rule is a remedy of last resort . . . .”). There is no
“exceptional reason” justifying exclusion. See United States v. Harrington, 681
F.2d 612, 615 (9th Cir. 1982).
Finally, the district court should not have summarily adopted the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation without addressing all of Defendant’s
objections, namely that the magistrate judge failed to address his constitutional
challenges to cross-certification. See Brown v. Roe, 279 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir.
2002). When a party objects to the proposed findings and recommendations, the
district court judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is
made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, in the case before us, addressing the
objections would not have resulted in a different outcome.
AFFIRMED.
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