David Kester v. Citimortgage Inc. ( 2021 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 24 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DAVID A. KESTER, on behalf of himself           No.    19-17109
    and all others similarly situated,
    D.C. No. 2:15-cv-00365-DLR
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    CITIMORTGAGE INC.; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 3, 2021**
    Phoenix, Arizona
    Before: W. FLETCHER, MILLER, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.
    This case comes before the court for the second time. Appellant David Kester
    sued Appellees CitiMortgage, Inc. and CR Title Services, Inc. (Defendants),
    asserting a single claim under Arizona’s wrongful recording statute, A.R.S. § 33-
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    420(A). Kester appeals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment
    in Defendants’ favor. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. L.F. v.
    Lake Wash. Sch. Dist. #414, 
    947 F.3d 621
    , 625 (9th Cir. 2020). “The court shall
    grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
    any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 56(a). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Kester, we
    conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact establishing that Defendants
    knew or should have known that Kristen Lindner’s notary commission was revoked
    when the trustee documents were recorded. See A.R.S. § 33-420(A) (imposing
    liability for recording a document asserting a “claim [of] interest in” real property
    when the person “know[s] or ha[s] reason to know” the document is invalid); see
    also A.R.S. § 33-401(B) (“Every deed or conveyance of real property must be signed
    by the grantor and must be duly acknowledged before some officer authorized to
    take acknowledgments.”).
    First, it is undisputed that neither Defendants nor Lindner received the
    December 6, 2010, letter stating that Lindner’s notary commission was revoked.
    Kester has also not identified any specific facts in his expert witness’s report or
    deposition that establishes an industry standard that required Defendants to verify
    Lindner’s notary commission with the secretary of state more often than once a
    2
    month. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 
    627 F.3d 376
    , 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining
    that when the moving party demonstrates an absence of a genuine issue of material
    fact, “the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate specific facts
    demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.”). Even if Defendants had
    followed a once-a-month standard, they would not necessarily have known that
    Lindner’s commission was revoked just eleven days before they recorded the
    documents at issue.
    Second, Defendants’ knowledge of the allegations in the complaint filed
    against Lindner is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Even
    assuming that revocation of Lindner’s notary credentials was likely, Defendants had
    no reason to know that her commission was revoked when Defendants recorded the
    documents. This is dispositive because under Arizona law, a notary is authorized to
    perform notary duties “until . . . the secretary of state revokes the commission.”
    A.R.S. § 41-312(D). Defendants were not obligated to stop using Lindner for notary
    services pending resolution of the complaint filed against her. Additionally,
    Lindner’s knowledge of the complaint filed against her is likewise insufficient to
    create a genuine issue of material fact under a respondeat superior theory for the
    same reasons that Defendants’ knowledge of the complaint was insufficient.
    Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of
    the Defendants.
    3
    AFFIRMED. 1
    1
    Kester’s motion to take judicial notice [Dkt. 21] is GRANTED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-17109

Filed Date: 2/24/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/24/2021