Ronald Singh v. Robert Wilkinson ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 5 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONALD VEER SINGH, AKA Ronald V. No. 19-72242
Singh,
Agency No. A070-148-397
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting
Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted February 10, 2021
San Francisco, California
Before: WARDLAW and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and CAIN,** District Judge.
Ronald Singh (“Singh”), a native and citizen of Fiji, petitions for review of
the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal
from the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) (collectively the “Agency”),
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable James David Cain, Jr., United States District Judge for
the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
denying his applications for adjustment of status, a waiver of inadmissibility under
8 U.S.C. § 1159(c), asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We dismiss the petition with respect to
Singh’s application for adjustment of status and deny the petition with respect to
Singh’s application for deferral of removal under the CAT.
1. Singh contends that the Agency erred in denying his application for an
adjustment of status. Grounds for inadmissibility, including convictions for crimes
involving moral turpitude and multiple criminal convictions, may be waived “for
humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public
interest.” 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c). We lack jurisdiction to review the Agency’s
discretionary decision whether to grant or deny a waiver of inadmissibility. 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). We retain jurisdiction to review only questions of law and
constitutional challenges. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see also Anaya-Ortiz v.
Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 2010). Singh claims to raise both legal and
constitutional challenges concerning the exercise of that discretion. Because Singh
does not raise a colorable constitutional claim or question of law, but rather asks us
to re-weigh the equities involved in the Agency’s decision, we lack jurisdiction
over these challenges. See Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 979–80 (9th
Cir. 2009).
Singh first contends that the Agency committed legal error when it did not
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consider country conditions evidence and public interest factors with respect to his
application for a waiver of inadmissibility. But the IJ stated that she “reviewed all
evidence and weighed all factors regarding humanitarian and hardship factors, as
they pertain both to [Singh] and his family members.” Furthermore, in the IJ’s
analysis of the CAT claim, she reviewed the country conditions evidence at length.
See Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Because there is
no evidence that the IJ failed to consider [the petitioner]’s documentary evidence,
we accept the IJ’s general statement that he considered all the evidence before
him.”). Contrary to Singh’s contentions, he does not establish that the Agency was
legally required to explicitly consider Singh’s restitution-based public policy
argument. See Ramirez-Villalpando v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir.
2011) (“The BIA is not required to ‘expressly parse or refute on the record each
individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner.’” (quoting
Wang v. Bd. of Immig. Appeals, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006))).
We reject Singh’s argument that the Agency denied him due process when it
concluded that he committed a violent or dangerous crime. Specifically, Singh
asserts that the agency mischaracterized the evidence and failed to consider
mitigating factors including findings of Singh’s diminished culpability. But this
contention is in substance an abuse of discretion argument, which we do not have
jurisdiction to review, even when Singh seeks to recharacterize it as a due process
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argument. See Mendez-Castro, 552 F.3d at 978. Singh separately contends that
the IJ’s factual finding in considering the humanitarian and hardship factors
violated due process because it was “based purely on conjecture and was contrary
to the evidence.” We do not have jurisdiction to review factual findings made in
the denial of discretionary relief, see Pechenkov v. Holder, 705 F.3d 444, 448–49
(9th Cir. 2012), and the challenged finding by the IJ indicates that the IJ considered
the evidence, balanced it, and came to a different conclusion than Singh would
have preferred, see Mendez-Castro, 552 F.3d at 980. We therefore dismiss Singh’s
petition with respect to his application for a waiver of inadmissibility for lack of
jurisdiction.
2. Singh contends that we should grant his petition and remand “in light of
the [A]gency’s failures” with respect to his CAT claim. Substantial evidence
supports the Agency’s finding that Singh did not establish that he will, more likely
than not, be subject to torture with the acquiescence or willful blindness of a
government official on return to Fiji. See Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 663
(9th Cir. 2019). More than thirty years have passed since the attack on Singh and
his parents, and circumstances in Fiji have changed significantly since Singh and
his family left. See Sowe v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1281, 1288 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[J]ust
as changed country conditions can defeat an asylum claim, they can also defeat a
claim for CAT protection.”).
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Despite Singh’s contention to the contrary, there is no indication that the IJ
did not consider all relevant evidence. See Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 771–72
(9th Cir. 2011). The IJ stated that she had considered all the evidence, and she
explicitly discussed the evidence with respect to Singh’s CAT claim for multiple
pages. See id. at 771. Moreover, the IJ specifically addressed the possibility of a
change in government, concluding that “[a]ny indications that the political
situation may shift in the future are speculative and insufficient to meet [Singh]’s
burden of proof that he would be subject to torture.”
PETITION DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.
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