Jorge Gonzalez Chavez v. Robert Wilkinson ( 2021 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 9 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JORGE GONZALEZ CHAVEZ, AKA No. 19-70798
Jorge Luis Ganzalezchavez,
Agency No. A204-229-169
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting
Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 5, 2021**
Pasadena, California
Before: KLEINFELD, CALLAHAN, and HIGGINSON,*** Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Stephen A. Higginson, United States Circuit Judge for
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Jorge Gonzalez Chavez claims the Board of Immigration Appeals erred by
finding he was competent to participate in his removal proceedings due to his
mental illness and prescription treatments. We review for abuse of discretion
whether the Board clearly departed from its own standards. Salgado v. Sessions,
889 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2018). The Board exercised discretion appropriately
when it held Chavez had a rational and factual understanding of the nature and
object of his removal proceedings, could consult with his attorney, and had a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence. See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N.
Dec. 474, 474 (B.I.A. 2011).
Gonzalez Chavez further argues that the Board erred in denying his claims
for asylum and withholding of removal. The Board’s factual findings are reviewed
for substantial evidence, but legal questions are reviewed de novo. Singh v.
Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471
F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2006)). Under the substantial evidence standard, we affirm
the Board’s decision unless compelled to conclude to the contrary. Id. Substantial
evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that petitioner’s generalized speculations
do not qualify as a reasonable fear of persecution on account of a statutorily
protected ground. See Nagoulko v. I.N.S., 333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
2
Because generalized fear does not establish a nexus to a protected ground, both the
asylum and withholding of removal claims necessarily fail. See, e.g.,
Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2010).
Gonzalez Chavez also argues that the Board erred in denying relief under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT). To qualify for CAT relief, the petitioner bears
the burden of establishing that he will more likely than not be tortured with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official if removed to his native country.
Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2020). Past torture is a
relevant factor in determining whether a petitioner will be tortured in the future. 8
C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). Petitioner does not claim past torture, and substantial
evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that his hypothetical chain of future
events failed to show he would probably be tortured by or with the consent of the
Mexican government if returned to Mexico.
Because the Board affirmed the Immigration Judge on the merits, it did not
need to address whether petitioner’s asylum application was timely. See I.N.S. v.
Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25–26 (1976).
3
The petition for review is DENIED.
4