David Priest v. D. Holbrook ( 2021 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 10 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVID R. PRIEST, No. 20-35178
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00133-RMP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
D. HOLBROOK, Superintendent;
JACKSON, Custody Program Supervisor;
A. ALVAREZ-JACKSON, Custody Unit
Supervisor; DAVID BREWER, Unit Sgt;
DUNCAN, Correction Officer #7388W;
DOE, Correction Officer #7423,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Rosanna Malouf Peterson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 5, 2021**
Seattle, Washington
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: RAWLINSON and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and ENGLAND,*** District
Judge.
Plaintiff/Appellant David Priest, a registered member of the Colville Indian
Tribe, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of various
Washington State Penitentiary (WSP) employees that he claims violated his
constitutional and statutory rights by stealing or destroying his sacred golden eagle
feathers after he was transferred from his single-person cell to segregation.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite them here. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo and “may affirm on any basis supported by the
record.” Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing
Burrell v. McIlroy, 464 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2006)). We affirm.
1. The district court correctly dismissed Priest’s constitutional claims1 based
on his failure to present evidence of Defendants’ integral participation in the taking
***
The Honorable Morrison C. England, Jr., Senior United States District
Judge for the Eastern District of California, sitting by designation.
1
Priest argues that the district court erroneously dismissed his equal
protection and due process claims sua sponte. It does not appear that these claims
were before the district court. See Priest v. Holbrook, No. 2:17-cv-00133-JLQ,
2017 WL 6328945, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2017), rev’d by 741 F. App’x 510
(9th Cir. 2018) (reversing and remanding, and only discussing Priest’s First
Amendment and RLUIPA claims). Even so, Priest’s additional constitutional
claims also suffer from lack of integral participation as discussed infra.
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or desecrating of his golden eagle feathers. An individual’s liability under § 1983
“is predicated on his ‘integral participation’ in the alleged violation.” Blankenhorn
v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 n.12 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Chuman v.
Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294–95 (9th Cir. 1996)). Although “[i]ntegral participation
does not require that each officer’s actions themselves rise to the level of a
constitutional violation . . . it does require some fundamental involvement in the
conduct that allegedly caused the violation.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
With respect to Defendants allegedly present at the scene (Lieutenant David
Brewer, Correctional Officer (CO) William Duncan, and CO Doe, aka Jose
Barreras-Miranda), Priest’s testimony establishes that Brewer, Duncan, and
Barreras-Miranda were working the third shift, during which Priest was transferred
from his single-person cell to segregation and COs packed up his personal
property. Our precedent, however, squarely forbids a jury from inferring liability
from presence alone. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 937 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“[H]olding individual officers who were merely present at the search liable for
such misconduct would go well beyond what [our precedent] would allow.”).
Thus, permitting Priest to proceed to trial on this record would not have “allow[ed]
a permissible inference, it would have afforded an impermissible basis for
liability.” Id. at 938.
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Nor can Priest establish causation through the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Even assuming, as the district court did, that such a theory of causation could apply
to Priest’s § 1983 claim, Priest has not demonstrated exclusive control. See, e.g.,
Jones, 297 F.3d at 939 (Silverman, J., concurring). The record establishes that “six
or seven COs” were in Priest’s unit during the third-shift. This precludes a finding
that named Defendants were the only officers who knew what occurred when
Priest’s cell was packed up. And while it is plausible that Duncan and Barreras-
Miranda were “at some point, uniquely responsible for Mr. Priest’s property,”
nothing in the record indicates the golden eagle feathers were not already gone by
the time Duncan and Barrerras-Miranda received Priest’s property in inventory.
Priest likewise fails to offer evidence demonstrating that Brewer,
Superintendent Holbrook, Custody Program Supervisor Jackson, and Custody
Supervisor Alvarado-Jackson are liable under a theory of supervisory liability. See
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011). Priest’s testimony merely
establishes that Brewer was present during the third shift. Priest likewise fails to
designate specific facts showing a genuine issue as to whether Holbrook, Jackson,
and Alvarado-Jackson caused the alleged constitutional violations. Instead, Priest
asks us to make broad inferences from the record, insisting his grievances
demonstrate an “obvious lack of investigation.” We decline to do so.
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2. The district court also correctly concluded that Priest’s lack of evidence
of a policy or practice prohibiting him from practicing his religion is fatal to his
claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.; see Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989,
994 (9th Cir. 2005). We first note that Priest’s 2018 release from prison moots any
claim under RLUIPA for injunctive and declaratory relief. Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d
1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995) (“An inmate’s release from prison while his claims are
pending generally will moot any claims for injunctive relief relating to the prison's
policies unless the suit has been certified as a class action.”); Rhodes v. Stewart,
488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (per curiam) (same for declaratory relief). Even so, Priest’s
claim also fails on the merits. Priest argues that WSP’s COs have a “practice of
not securing religious property.” The record does not support Priest’s contention,
as he testified that he was unaware of other instances in which COs violated WSP
policy when transporting his or another an inmate’s religious property.
AFFIRMED.
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