Luis Rodriguez-Esparza v. Merrick Garland ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 17 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LUIS RODRIGUEZ-ESPARZA, No. 18-72386
Petitioner, Agency No. A029-202-189
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 5, 2021**
Pasadena, California
Before: MILLER and LEE, Circuit Judges, and HILLMAN,*** District Judge.
Luis Rodriguez-Esparza, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review
of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming an immigration judge’s
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Timothy Hillman, United States District Judge for the
District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
denial of his application for withholding of removal and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(1). We deny the petition.
1. While we lack jurisdiction to review the ultimate determination that a
crime is particularly serious, we have jurisdiction to decide whether the Board
applied the correct legal standard and whether it abused its discretion by failing to
consider the appropriate factors and evidence. Flores-Vega v. Barr, 932 F.3d 878,
884 (9th Cir. 2019). The Board correctly stated that under Matter of Frentescu, 18
I. & N. Dec. 244 (B.I.A. 1982), it was required to consider whether “the nature of
the conviction, the underlying facts and circumstances and the sentence imposed
justify the presumption that the convicted immigrant is a danger to the
community.” Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
The Board did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Rodriguez-
Esparza’s conviction on four counts of transporting and selling a controlled
substance, in violation of California Health & Safety Code § 11352, is a
particularly serious crime rendering him ineligible for withholding of removal. See
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (statutory withholding); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2)
(withholding under the CAT). The Board considered the nature of the conviction—
a drug offense—and found that “drug trafficking is dangerous to those involved as
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well as to society in general.” In adopting and affirming the immigration judge’s
decision, the Board considered the case-specific facts surrounding Rodriguez-
Esparza’s conviction: that he pleaded guilty to four counts committed on separate
days; that he possessed at least 28.5 grams of cocaine; that “he did not know the
vehicle he was driving contained drugs”; and that he pleaded guilty only “because
the owner of the tire shop where he was employed promised to reward him with
money if he took the blame.” See Flores-Vega, 932 F.3d at 885. Finally, the Board
expressly considered the length of the sentence. The Board was not required to find
Rodriguez-Esparza’s conviction not particularly serious simply because he
received the statutory minimum sentence. See id.
2. Reviewing its “legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for
substantial evidence,” we conclude that the Board did not err in denying
Rodriguez-Esparza deferral of removal under the CAT. Bringas-Rodriguez v.
Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). The Board concluded that
even though Rodriguez-Esparza had been tortured by cartel members in Mexico,
he had not established the requisite state action. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846
F.3d 351, 363 (9th Cir. 2017). The Board considered Rodriguez-Esparza’s
“credible but sparse testimony that he heard voices over two-way radios and,
despite his eyes being covered most of the time, he saw boots, blue pants with a
stripe, and a patch on a shirt” but found it “insufficient to establish the involvement
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of a public official.” Without more, Rodriguez-Esparza’s testimony does not
compel the conclusion that the men he described were police officers.
The Board also approved the immigration judge’s finding that the country
conditions evidence was insufficient to “show that government officials in Mexico
would participate or would be otherwise willfully blind to [Rodriguez-Esparza’s]
torture at the hands of criminals.” The country reports do not compel a contrary
conclusion. In Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1185–86 (9th Cir. 2020),
we held that country reports documenting pervasive corruption between local
Mexican police and the Zetas cartel compelled the conclusion that public officials
would acquiesce in future torture where the petitioner had credibly testified that
local officials had already acquiesced in her past torture. By contrast, Rodriguez-
Esparza has not shown a link between his past torture at the hands of private cartel
members and general reports of corruption in Mexico sufficient to compel the
conclusion that public officials would acquiesce in any future torture.
Finally, the Board did not impermissibly fault Rodriguez-Esparza for failing
to establish his inability to relocate within Mexico. See Maldonado v. Lynch, 786
F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Instead, the immigration judge found
“insufficient evidence to make a finding” on relocation and therefore relied “more
heavily” on other factors in denying relief. Recognizing that relocation was not a
“significant factor” in the immigration judge’s analysis, the Board did not err in
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affirming due to a lack of government acquiescence.
PETITION DENIED.
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