Douglas Cruz v. Joseph Decker ( 2021 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 17 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DOUGLAS CRUZ; LAURA J. BUCKLEY,                 No.    20-15745
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,          D.C. No.
    2:19-cv-00265-JAD-NJK
    v.
    JOSEPH DECKER,                                  MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted March 10, 2021
    Las Vegas, Nevada
    Before: CLIFTON, NGUYEN, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiffs Douglas Cruz and Laura Buckley appeal the district court’s
    dismissal of their lawsuit brought under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     on account of defendant
    Joseph Decker’s qualified immunity. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . Reviewing de novo, see Keates v. Koile, 
    883 F.3d 1228
    , 1234 (9th Cir.
    2018), we affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages
    unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or
    constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of
    the challenged conduct.” Olivier v. Baca, 
    913 F.3d 852
    , 860 (9th Cir. 2019)
    (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 
    563 U.S. 731
    , 735 (2011)). “For a right to be ‘clearly
    established,’ existing ‘precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
    question beyond debate,’ such that ‘every’ reasonable official would have
    understood that he was violating a clearly established right.” 
    Id.
     (quoting al-Kidd,
    
    563 U.S. at 741
    ).
    1. In re Stratton, No. A-16-738866-J (Nev. Dist. Ct. Mar. 21, 2017), did
    not clearly establish that Decker was obligated to update the actuarial table used to
    calculate lump sum payments of permanent partial disability awards. “[A] district
    judge’s ipse dixit of a holding is not ‘controlling authority’ in any jurisdiction,”
    and a single trial court ruling “falls far short of what is necessary” to clearly
    establish a legal rule “absent controlling authority: a robust ‘consensus of cases of
    persuasive authority.’” al-Kidd, 
    563 U.S. at
    741–42 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 
    526 U.S. 603
    , 617 (1999)).
    Stratton was not “a controlling command to Decker” personally, as plaintiffs
    argue, because Decker was not a party to that litigation in his individual capacity.
    The relevant party was either the Nevada Division of Industrial Relations (“DIR”),
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    a state agency, or Decker in his official capacity as the DIR Administrator, which
    is the same thing. See Craig v. Donnelly, 
    439 P.3d 413
    , 416 (Nev. Ct. App. 2019)
    (“[W]hen state officials or employees are sued in their official capacities, such
    actions are truly against the office, not the individual, such that the action is
    effectively against the state itself.” (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 
    491 U.S. 58
    , 71 (1989))).
    Nor is it of any consequence that Stratton placed DIR under a legal
    obligation to update the actuarial table for the purpose of recalculating Larry
    Stratton’s award. Even assuming that Decker personally had an obligation to
    ensure that DIR complied with the Stratton order in less than nine months, as
    plaintiffs assert, that obligation sheds no light on whether it was clearly established
    that Stratton was correct as a matter of Nevada law. It is not enough that Decker
    violated a legal duty to comply with a court order if his noncompliance with that
    order was not the basis of the § 1983 suit. See Davis v. Scherer, 
    468 U.S. 183
    ,
    193–96 (1984).
    2. The statutory amendment also did not clearly establish that Decker
    violated a legal duty. While the amended statute provided that the actuarial table
    “must be adjusted . . . on July 1 of each year,” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616C.495(5)
    (2017), it was reasonably uncertain whether the first adjustment was required in
    2017 or 2018. For DIR to have acted by July 1, 2017, it would have had to bypass
    3
    the procedures for promulgating new regulations normally required by Nevada’s
    Administrative Procedure Act. If the state legislature expected such a deviation, it
    likely would have expressed its intent more clearly.
    AFFIRMED.
    4