Jose Velez Velasquez v. Merrick Garland ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 19 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE ANGEL VELEZ VELASQUEZ, No. 17-70380
Petitioner, Agency No. A076-737-409
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 16, 2021**
Before: GRABER, R. NELSON, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.
Jose Angel Velez Velasquez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial
evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse
credibility determinations under the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d
1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010). We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a
continuance, Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009), and we
review de novo claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings, Jiang
v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2014). We deny in part and dismiss in part
the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination
based on Velez Velasquez’s inconsistent statements about whether his family
reported his cousin’s son’s murder to the police and whether his cousin knew gang
members, his omission of departures from the United States, and other implausible,
non-responsive, and evasive testimony. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d. at 1048 (adverse
credibility determination reasonable under “the totality of circumstances”). Velez
Velasquez’s explanations do not compel a contrary conclusion. See Lata v. INS,
204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence also supports the
agency’s finding that Velez Velasquez did not present documentary evidence that
would otherwise establish his eligibility for relief. See Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d
785, 791 (9th Cir. 2014) (petitioner’s documentary evidence was insufficient to
independently support claim). Thus, in the absence of credible testimony, in this
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case, Velez Velasquez’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. See
Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of Velez Velasquez’s
CAT claim because it was based on the same evidence found not credible, and
Velez Velasquez does not point to any other evidence in the record that compels
the conclusion that it is more likely than not he would be tortured by or with the
consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Mexico. See Shrestha,
590 F.3d at 1048-49.
The agency did not abuse its discretion in concluding Velez Velasquez failed
to show good cause for a continuance. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29; Ahmed, 569 F.3d at
1012 (listing factors to consider in reviewing the denial of a continuance).
Velez Velasquez’s contention that the agency’s denial of a continuance
violated his right to due process fails. See Lata, 204 F.3d at 1246 (requiring error
to prevail on a due process claim).
We lack jurisdiction to review Velez Velasquez’s contentions concerning the
IJ’s consideration of the government’s evidence of a 2003 reentry and alleged bias
against him. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (court
lacks jurisdiction over claims not raised to agency).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
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