Alice Brown v. County of San Bernardino ( 2021 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAR 19 2021
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ALICE BROWN,                                     No.    19-56033
    Plaintiff-Appellant,               D.C. No.
    5:13-cv-00130-DSF-FFM
    v.
    COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO;                        MEMORANDUM*
    SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, Big Bear
    Station; M. MCCRACKEN, San
    Bernardino County Deputy Sheriff;
    MASON, Sergeant; ESTATE OF
    JEREMIAH MACKAY,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 17, 2021**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
    oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Alice Brown appeals pro se the district court’s partial grant of qualified
    immunity and its judgment after a jury verdict on her 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     claims
    against Deputy Marke McCracken and the Estate of Detective Jeremiah MacKay
    for violating her Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association. We affirm.
    The district court properly granted qualified immunity to McCracken for
    Brown’s claim alleging violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to care,
    custody, and control of her child based on McCracken’s retention and later transfer
    of her child to San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (“CFS”). We
    review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment based on qualified
    immunity. See Vazquez v. County of Kern, 
    949 F.3d 1153
    , 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
    Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages
    insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
    constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson
    v. Callahan, 
    555 U.S. 223
    , 231, 
    129 S. Ct. 808
    , 815, 
    172 L. Ed. 2d 565
     (2009). It
    is not clearly established that there is a Fourteenth Amendment violation in a
    situation like the one here, where the child’s mother asserts that her rights were
    violated because her child, who was in protective police custody, was placed with
    CFS when the whereabouts of a parent or legal guardian was unknown. As a
    2                                     19-56033
    result, McCracken is entitled to qualified immunity. See Kisela v. Hughes, __
    U.S.__, __, 
    138 S. Ct. 1148
    , 1152, 
    200 L. Ed. 2d 449
     (2018) (per curiam).
    Brown also argues for the first time on appeal that the jury was racially
    biased against her and that the district court’s comments during trial prejudiced the
    jury. We review forfeited rights for plain error. See Hoard v. Hartman, 
    904 F.3d 780
    , 786–87 (9th Cir. 2018). Brown has not shown any obvious error affecting her
    substantial rights. Her generalized assertions of systemic racism in America are
    insufficient to establish actual or implied juror bias. See Fields v. Woodford, 
    309 F.3d 1095
    , 1103–04 (9th Cir.), amended by, 
    315 F.3d 1062
     (9th Cir. 2002).
    Similarly, Brown has not shown any judicial misconduct. That the district court
    occasionally stopped Brown from asking witnesses certain questions or from
    testifying while acting in her role as an advocate does not itself show misconduct,
    let alone plain error. See Larson v. Palmateer, 
    515 F.3d 1057
    , 1067 (9th Cir.
    2008); Hansen v. Comm’r, 
    820 F.2d 1464
    , 1467 (9th Cir. 1987).
    Finally, Brown waived review of whether the district court properly redacted
    the jury foreperson’s name from the verdict form. See Resorts Int’l, Inc. v.
    Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 
    67 F.3d 1394
    , 1402 (9th Cir. 1995). She also
    waived review of whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. See
    Smith v. Marsh, 
    194 F.3d 1045
    , 1052 (9th Cir. 1999). Even if she had raised the
    3                                     19-56033
    argument in her opening brief, Brown’s failure to make the appropriate motions
    under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50 and 59 precludes this court’s review.
    See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 
    546 U.S. 394
    , 401–04, 
    126 S. Ct. 980
    , 985–87, 
    163 L. Ed. 2d 974
     (2006); Nitco Holding Corp. v. Boujikian, 
    491 F.3d 1086
    , 1088–90 (9th Cir. 2007).
    AFFIRMED.
    4                                  19-56033