United States v. Sean Bremner ( 2021 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 25 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    20-30039
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
    4:19-cr-00065-BMM-1
    v.
    SEAN HENRY WHITE BREMNER, AKA                   MEMORANDUM*
    Sean Bremz,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 4, 2021**
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: BOGGS,*** PAEZ, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
    The government appeals the district court’s dismissal of Count II of a five-
    count indictment, which charges Sean Bremner with production of child
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    pornography in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2251
    (a). The district court dismissed
    Count II because the allegations did not show a sufficient connection to interstate
    commerce. We have jurisdiction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3731
    . Reviewing de novo, we
    reverse. See United States v. Laursen, 
    847 F.3d 1026
    , 1031 (9th Cir. 2017).
    1. Bremner’s alleged conduct may not be connected to interstate commerce,
    but such a connection is not required. Congress may regulate “activities that
    substantially affect interstate commerce.” United States v. Lopez, 
    514 U.S. 549
    ,
    558–59 (1995). “When Congress decides that the total incidence of a practice
    poses a threat to a national market,” it considers the practice in the aggregate and
    “may regulate the entire class.” Gonzales v. Raich, 
    545 U.S. 1
    , 17 (2005) (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    We have applied this principle to child pornography cases, including
    violations of § 2251(a). See United States v. McCalla, 
    545 F.3d 750
    , 756 (9th Cir.
    2008); United States v. Sullivan, 
    797 F.3d 623
    , 632 (9th Cir. 2015); Laursen, 847
    F.3d at 1035. In United States v. McCalla, we held that “it is eminently rational
    that Congress would seek to regulate intrastate production of pornography even
    where there is no evidence that it was created for commercial purposes.” 
    545 F.3d at 755
    . The individual circumstances of Bremner’s alleged production of child
    pornography do not matter, because “when a general regulatory statute bears a
    substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances
    2
    arising under that statute is of no consequence.” 
    Id. at 756
    . Bremner’s alleged
    conduct may have had no connection to the broader market for child pornography,
    but McCalla does not require such a connection.
    In dismissing Count II, the district court relied on a pre-Raich case, United
    States v. McCoy, 
    323 F.3d 1114
     (9th Cir. 2003), and Bremner argues that Raich did
    not fully overrule McCoy. But even assuming that some aspect of McCoy’s
    holding survived Raich, that aspect does not apply to this case. McCalla held that
    “to the extent the reasoning employed in McCoy relied on the local nature of the
    activity, it has been overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Raich.” 
    545 F.3d at 756
    . Bremner argues that McCoy also relied on the “non-commercial
    nature of the activity,” and that Raich and McCalla did not overrule that aspect of
    McCoy’s holding. But McCalla also held that Congress may regulate the
    production of child pornography even when the production was not for a
    commercial purpose. 
    545 F.3d at 755
    .
    2. To the extent that Bremner argues that the jurisdictional requirement of §
    2251(a) has not been met, the government has alleged sufficient information that,
    if proven, can satisfy the jurisdictional requirement. Evidence that a device used to
    produce child pornography traveled in interstate commerce—including a phone or
    computer—satisfies the jurisdictional requirement of § 2251(a). See United States
    3
    v. Sheldon, 
    755 F.3d 1047
    , 1050 (9th Cir. 2014).1
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
    1
    Similarly, Bremner’s reliance on United States v. Wright, 
    625 F.3d 583
     (9th Cir.
    2010), to argue that after Raich an individualized connection to interstate
    commerce is still jurisdictionally required, is misplaced. Wright concerned
    whether the government provided sufficient evidence to meet the jurisdictional
    requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1), not Congress’s authority to regulate
    under the Commerce Clause. See 
    625 F.3d at 600
    .
    4