Richard Jenkins v. Kenneth Little ( 2021 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 25 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RICHARD ANTHONY JENKINS,                        No. 20-35195
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 1:19-cv-00247-DCN
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    KENNETH LITTLE, M.D.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Idaho
    David C. Nye, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 16, 2021**
    Before:      GRABER, R. NELSON, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.
    Oregon state prisoner Richard Anthony Jenkins appeals pro se from the
    district court’s judgment dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging deliberate
    indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo. Watison v. Carter, 
    668 F.3d 1108
    , 1112 (9th Cir.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2012) (dismissal under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii)); Resnick v. Hayes, 
    213 F.3d 443
    , 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Jenkins’s action because his claim was
    barred by the statute of limitations. See 
    Idaho Code § 5-219
    (4) (two-year statute of
    limitations for personal injury actions); Soto v. Sweetman, 
    882 F.3d 865
    , 871-72
    (9th Cir. 2018) (state tolling and statute of limitations for personal injury claims
    apply to § 1983 actions; federal law governs when a claim accrues, which is when
    a plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that forms the basis for his cause of
    action). Jenkins’s contention that equitable tolling or equitable estoppel should
    apply is without merit. See Wilhelm v. Frampton, 
    158 P.3d 310
    , 312 (Idaho 2007)
    (Idaho courts cannot equitably toll statute of limitations); J.R. Simplot Co. v.
    Chemetics Int’l Inc., 
    887 P.2d 1039
    , 1041 (Idaho 1994) (equitable estoppel is
    available in Idaho only if plaintiff lacks actual or constructive knowledge of the
    truth), abrogated on other grounds by Day as Tr. of Tr. B of Donald M. Day &
    Marjorie D. Day Family Tr. v. Transportation Dep’t, 
    458 P.3d 162
     (Idaho 2020).
    AFFIRMED.
    2                                       20-35195