On Demand Direct Response, LLC v. Shana McCart-pollak ( 2021 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 31 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ON DEMAND DIRECT RESPONSE, LLC;                 No.    19-15948
    et al.,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiffs,                     2:15-cv-01576-MMD-GWF
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    SHANA LEE MCCART-POLLAK, DBA
    LOL Buddies Enterprises,
    Defendant-third-party-
    plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    JAY AT PLAY INTERNATIONAL, LTD.;
    et al.,
    Third-party-defendants-
    Appellees,
    and
    JAY FRANCO & SONS, INC.,
    Third-party-defendant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Submitted March 30, 2021**
    Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Shana Lee McCart-Pollak (“Pollak”) appeals pro se the district court’s
    orders dismissing in part and granting summary judgment in part on her third-party
    claims in an action brought under the Lanham Act by On Demand Direct
    Response, LLC, and On Demand Direct Response III, LLC. We review de novo
    the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, and we review for an abuse
    of discretion the district court’s denial of leave to amend. Sonner v. Premier
    Nutrition Corp., 
    962 F.3d 1072
    , 1076 (9th Cir. 2020). We review de novo the
    district court’s grant of summary judgment. Branch Banking & Trust Co. v.
    D.M.S.I., LLC, 
    871 F.3d 751
    , 759 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
    The district court properly denied leave to amend after concluding that the
    third-party defendants had not consented to amendment of Pollak’s third-party
    complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (party may amend pleading either with
    opposing party’s consent or by leave of court). The district court properly, without
    prior notice, sua sponte dismissed claims for failure to state a claim under Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) after concluding that Pollak could not possibly
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2
    win relief on those claims, and properly gave her notice, as a pro se litigant, of
    which other claims could be amended. See Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 
    813 F.2d 986
    , 991 (9th Cir. 1987) (a sua sponte dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “may be
    made without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief”); Ferdik v.
    Bonzelet, 
    963 F.2d 1258
    , 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[B]efore dismissing a pro se
    complaint the district court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies
    in his complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend
    effectively.”). After allowing amendment only of certain claims, the district court
    properly exercised its discretion in striking from a subsequent amended third-party
    complaint the claims that it previously had dismissed without leave to amend. See
    Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 
    975 F.2d 604
    , 607 (9th Cir. 1992) (court
    has broad discretion to manage its docket).
    The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Pollak’s
    claim for unjust enrichment because she failed to establish a triable issue on
    whether she conferred a benefit on third-party defendant Kevin Harrington,
    whether he received value from such a benefit, or whether he retained the benefit
    under circumstances such that it would be inequitable for him to retain the benefit
    without payment of its value. See Certified Fire Prot., Inc. v. Precision Constr.,
    Inc., 
    283 P.3d 250
    , 257 (Nev. 2012) (elements of unjust enrichment under Nevada
    law).
    3
    The district court properly exercised its discretion in denying Pollak’s
    motion for discovery sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1).
    See Ingenco Holdings, LLC v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 
    921 F.3d 803
    , 808 (9th Cir. 2019).
    The issue whether the district court abused its discretion in entering a
    preliminary injunction against Pollak is moot because the preliminary injunction
    has expired, and the district court has entered final judgment. See Shell Offshore,
    Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 
    815 F.3d 623
    , 628 (9th Cir. 2016).
    Pollak’s motion to include transcripts in the record on appeal (Docket Entry
    No. 4) is denied as unnecessary.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-15948

Filed Date: 3/31/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/31/2021