Stanley Tsuji v. Kamehameha Schools , 678 F. App'x 552 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 23 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STANLEY R. TSUJI, No. 16-15105
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:14-cv-00206-JMS-
BMK
v.
KAMEHAMEHA SCHOOLS, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
J. Michael Seabright, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 14, 2017**
Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
Stanley R. Tsuji appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in his employment action alleging claims under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo,
Smith v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2013), and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tsuji’s
discrimination claim because Tsuji failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether he was disabled, and whether defendant’s legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining disability); Smith, 727 F.3d at 955 (setting forth
elements of a prima facie case of ADA discrimination); Snead v. Metro. Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2001) (outlining requirements for
showing that termination was pretextual).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tsuji’s failure-to-
accommodate claim because Tsuji failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether he
was disabled. See Allen v. Pac. Bell, 348 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting
forth elements of prima facie case under the ADA for failure-to-accommodate).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tsuji’s retaliation
claim because Tsuji failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether there was a causal
link between Tsuji’s protected activity and his termination, and whether
defendant’s reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual. See Brown v.
City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements of a
prima facie case of ADA retaliation, and requirements for establishing pretext).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
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Tsuji’s motion to vacate his reply brief is denied as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.
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