United States v. Jens Davis ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 16 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-30178
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
1:18-cr-00052-EJL-1
v.
JENS RANDALL DAVIS, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 13, 2021**
Seattle, Washington
Before: O’SCANNLAIN and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,***
District Judge.
Jens Randall Davis appeals his conviction and sentence for possessing a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).1 He challenges the district
court’s finding of competency and admission of “other acts” evidence under
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
and affirm.
1. The district court did not clearly err in finding Davis competent to stand
trial. The court properly credited the Bureau of Prisons’ psychologist over the
defense’s expert because she and Bureau of Prisons staff had interacted with and
observed Davis. She also reviewed his medical and legal records and interviewed
his family members. This evidence supported her conclusion that Davis’s mental
health issues stemmed from his drug use and resolved shortly after he detoxed.
The court also properly relied on its own observations of Davis’s courtroom
conduct and correspondence, which were consistent with the Bureau of Prisons’
expert’s opinion. While Davis refused to cooperate with the experts’
examinations, courts are not limited to examination results and may consider other
evidence, including “the defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor in court,
and any prior medical opinions on his competence.” United States v. Gastelum-
Almeida, 298 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002). Such evidence supported the
court’s determination here.
1
Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we restate only those necessary to
explain our decision.
2
Davis contends that the district court ignored evidence of his incompetence,
but the court’s order belies this contention. It shows that the court carefully
considered and gave germane reasons for discounting the defense expert’s opinion,
the defense counsel’s concerns, and aspects of Davis’s medical history. For
example, the defense expert deemed Davis incompetent despite opining that he
could not reach a professionally-sound conclusion without an evaluation. Also,
unlike the Bureau of Prisons’ expert, the defense expert did not interact with Davis
beyond Davis’s immediate refusal to speak with him. Thus, when weighed against
the Bureau of Prisons’ expert’s report and Davis’s own behavior and
communications, the court appropriately found this contrary evidence less
persuasive.
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting, under Rule
404(b), evidence that Davis sought to obtain a firearm through a colleague. First,
this evidence was material because it tended to show Davis’s intent to possess a
gun and provided a strong inference that Davis knowingly possessed a gun. See
United States v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1997) (setting forth the
four-part test of admissibility under Rule 404(b)). Second, the evidence was not
too remote in time, as the conversation in question took place just one month prior
to the charged offense. Third, the testimonial evidence was sufficient to support a
finding that Davis made the request. See id. at 1283 (providing that “the testimony
3
of a single witness can be sufficient”). Fourth, attempting to possess a firearm and
subsequently possessing one are very similar acts. And finally, the evidence’s
probative value was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact under
Rule 403.
AFFIRMED.
4