United States v. Emiel Kandi ( 2021 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
APR 16 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 20-30061
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:13-cr-05369-RBL-1
v.
EMIEL A. KANDI, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 14, 2021**
Seattle, Washington
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, GRABER, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Emiel Kandi appeals three conditions of his three-year term of
supervised release. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, United States v. Napulou,
593 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010), we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Defendant to
deposit all income into, and pay all expenses from, a single bank account.
Defendant pleaded guilty to defrauding the government of more than $800,000
through falsified mortgage applications. He then failed to comply with a condition
that he supply his probation officer with an accurate accounting of his assets and
income. Thus, the district court permissibly concluded that a third-party
accounting of Defendant’s finances would best reflect his characteristics, deter
future lawbreaking, and protect the public. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e)(2), 3553(a). That
Defendant, who submitted mortgage applications to financial institutions, now has
a philosophical objection to banking does not alter the calculus.
Nor did the district court run afoul of our cases when it told Defendant that it
had "delegated" authority to resolve disputes to the probation officer. Cf. United
States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 883 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the district
court impermissibly delegated its statutory duty "when it failed to state the
maximum number of non-treatment drug tests the probation officer could impose"
(emphasis omitted)). The district court made that comment after it stated that it
would impose the disputed condition. In context, the comment did not
retroactively taint that decision. The court’s statement is most naturally read not as
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delegating the decision of what condition to impose but, rather, as inviting
Defendant to demonstrate to his probation officer that his compromise is workable.
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in requiring that Defendant
receive approval before working "in the field of mortgage loans and debt
consolidation." The district court permissibly concluded that the condition is
"reasonably related" to the nature and circumstances of the offense, protecting the
public, and deterring future offenses. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e)(2), 3583(d). That the
government was open to an alternative condition as a compromise does not
undermine the district court’s decision. Furthermore, if Defendant obtains
approval, he may still work in the commercial lending industry.
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to modify its
condition that Defendant "shall not be self-employed nor shall [he] be employed by
friends, relatives, associates or persons previously known to the defendant, unless
approved by the U.S. Probation Officer." Given Defendant’s fraudulent loan
scheme and his failure to comply with financial disclosure conditions early in his
term of supervision, the district court permissibly concluded that Defendant would
fare better if a neutral third party supervised his work. Defendant’s suggestion that
the condition infringes on his "fundamental right to familial association," United
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States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2012), is not well taken.
Defendant is not barred from associating with family members.
AFFIRMED.
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