Scott Stoner v. County of Riverside ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 3 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SCOTT STONER, No. 19-55920
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
5:16-cv-01045-JAK-PLA
v.
DOES, 1 - 10, inclusive; MICHAEL MEMORANDUM*
HEUER, Deputy,
Defendants,
and
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE; RICHARD
FRANSIK, Deputy,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 11, 2020
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and HILLMAN,** District
Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Timothy Hillman, United States District Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
Memorandum joined by Judge VANDYKE and Judge HILLMAN
Dissent by Judge WARDLAW
Defendants County of Riverside and Deputy Fransik appeal the district court’s
grant of Plaintiff Stoner’s Rule 59(e) motion to amend the judgment reached by the
jury. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the grant of a Rule
59(e) motion for abuse of discretion. Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty. v. ACandS,
Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). The district court may grant Rule 59(e)
motions where it “(1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed
clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an
intervening change in controlling law.” Id. at 1263. Based on the jury instructions
and jury verdict form, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in
amending the verdict and reverse.
Stoner filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendants used
excessive force to arrest him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The case
proceeded to a jury trial and the parties’ attorneys agreed to the jury instructions.
Jury Instruction 26 listed eight factors for the jury to consider “[i]n determining
whether the officer used excessive force.” Question 1 on the jury verdict form asked
whether Deputy Fransik “use[d] excessive or unreasonable force against Scott
Stoner” and the jurors checked “yes.” But that was only the initial step in the
analysis. The jury verdict form then asked in Question 2 whether Deputy Fransik’s
actions were “the moving force in causing harm to Scott Stoner,” and the jurors
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checked “no.” According to the form, the jurors did not have to answer further
questions after answering Question 2 in the negative. The district court initially
entered the verdict as a defense judgment.
The district court then granted Stoner’s Rule 59(e) motion to amend the
judgment to a Plaintiff’s verdict, concluding that “the jury found that Corporal
Fransik violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights” because in answering “yes”
to Question 1, the jurors found “that Corporal Fransik had not acted in an
‘objectively reasonable’ manner.” But the former does not follow from the latter,
especially in light of Jury Instruction 27, which stated that “to establish that the acts
of [the officer] deprived the plaintiff of particular rights … the plaintiff must prove
… that the [officer’s] acts were ... the moving force that caused the ultimate injury.”
(emphasis added). This instruction was explicit and consistent with precedent: both
factual and proximate causation are required to find a constitutional violation.
Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008); see also
Preschooler II v. Clark Cty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007).
Under the jury instructions that both parties agreed to, there could be no
constitutional violation unless under Question 2 the jury found Deputy Fransik’s
unreasonable force was the proximate cause of Stoner’s injuries.
We presume jurors follow jury instructions, see Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S.
225, 234 (2000), and the jurors concluded through Question 2 on the jury verdict
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form that Deputy Fransik was not the “moving force,” or proximate cause, of
Stoner’s injuries. The jurors thus necessarily did not find a constitutional violation.1
The district court’s conversion of the jury’s defense verdict grant to a Plaintiff’s
verdict was clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion.
REVERSED.2
1
This case involves a finding of excessive force coupled with a finding that the force used was not
the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury, and thus not a constitutional violation. The cases
cited by the Plaintiff and the district court that address jury findings of a confirmed constitutional
violation, but with no compensable injury, are thus inapposite. See Guy v. City of San Diego, 608
F.3d 582, 585 (9th Cir. 2010); George v. City of Long Beach, 973 F.2d 706, 708 (9th Cir. 1992);
Romberg v. Nichols, 953 F.2d 1152, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 1992), opinion amended and superseded,
970 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 506 U.S. 1075 (1993); Floyd v.
Laws, 929 F.2d 1390, 1402–03 (9th Cir. 1991).
2
Because we find no constitutional violation and reverse, we do not reach Defendants’ second
argument that Stoner’s § 1983 claim violated the Heck bar.
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FILED
Stoner v. County of Riverside, No. 19-55920 DEC 3 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge, dissenting: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I respectfully dissent. I am not “convinced firmly that the reviewed decision
lies beyond the pale of reasonable justification under the circumstances.” Estate of
Diaz v. City of Anaheim, 840 F.3d 592, 601 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Harman v.
Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Here, the jury was not tasked with returning a general verdict in favor of one
party or the other; it was asked to make three factual findings in response to
questions on a special verdict form. The jury’s answers to the first two questions
created an ambiguity as to whether it found a constitutional violation—in other
words, whether the court should enter a verdict in favor of the plaintiff or the
defense. When there is ambiguity in a jury’s answers on a special verdict form, “it
is the duty of the courts to attempt to harmonize the answers,” including “by
exegesis if necessary.” Gallick v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119
(1963). Here, the district court concluded that the jury’s answers could be
“harmonized” because “under the instruction to which both sides agreed, the jury
could conclude that, although Corporal Fransik used excessive force when he
released Whiskey and/or when he did not remove him sooner from Plaintiff, those
actions were not the ‘moving force’ behind Plaintiff’s severe and atypical injuries.”
The district court concluded that, by answering “yes” to Question 1, “the jury
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found that Corporal Fransik violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.”
“[T]hat the jury answered ‘no’ to Question 2 . . . does not mean that it found no
constitutional violation. It instead shows that the jury made a finding that
precludes Plaintiff from recovering compensatory damages for the injuries he
sustained.” That is, though there was excessive use of force in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, as the jury was instructed in Jury Instruction No. 26, that force
was not “the moving force that caused the ultimate injury,” as instructed by Jury
Instruction No. 27.
This was a reasonable conclusion in light of the two instructions, read
together. Instruction No. 26 described excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Verdict Question 1 asked whether Fransik used excessive force, and
the jury responded affirmatively, finding the constitutional violation. Instruction
No. 27 introduced the requirement of causation, and in verdict Question 2 the jury
found Fransik’s use of unconstitutional force did not cause Stoner’s “ultimate
injury.” Ample evidence in this particular record supported the jury’s finding, as
after the dog seized Stoner, he fought with the dog, creating the atypical injuries
Stoner ultimately suffered. This interpretation of the verdict does not “lie[] beyond
the pale of reasonable justification.’” Estate of Diaz, 840 F.3d at 601.
Because the majority reverses on the jury verdict issue, it does not reach
Fransik’s claim that Stoner’s suit against him was Heck-barred. The district court
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did not err by denying Fransik’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Heck
grounds. Stoner was convicted for “knowingly resist[ing], by the use of force or
violence,” Deputy Heuer’s undisputedly lawful attempt to arrest him. Cal. Penal
Code § 69 (West). Whether or not Corporal Fransik used illegal excessive force
when he released the K-9 is irrelevant to the “lawful[ness]” of Deputy Heuer’s
actions. People v. Smith, 57 Cal. 4th 232, 241 (2013). Therefore, “a judgment in
favor of” Stoner against Fransik does not “necessarily imply the invalidity of
[Stoner’s] conviction or sentence.” 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).
For the above reasons, I would affirm the district court’s judgment in full.
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