Lucia Espindola Rivera v. William Barr ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        DEC 4 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LUCIA ESPINDOLA RIVERA; et al.,                 No.    19-73104
    Petitioners,                    Agency Nos.       A202-155-028
    A202-155-030
    v.                                                               A202-155-031
    A202-155-032
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
    Respondent.                     MEMORANDUM*
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted November 18, 2020**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: GOULD and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and CHEN,*** District Judge.
    Lucia Espindola Rivera and three of her children, natives and citizens of
    Mexico, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order
    dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying their
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Edward M. Chen, United States District Judge for the
    Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
    applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
    Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . We
    review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Zehatye v. Gonzales,
    
    453 F.3d 1182
    , 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006). We deny the petition for review.
    The agency’s determination that Petitioners failed to establish they suffered
    harm rising to the level of persecution is supported by substantial evidence. The
    threats received by Petitioners were not coupled with any close confrontation or
    action. Petitioners lived unharmed in Mexico for two years after Espindola
    Rivera’s sons went missing until Petitioners came to the United States. See Duran-
    Rodriguez v. Barr, 
    918 F.3d 1025
    , 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding death threats from
    hitmen who took no action against petitioner or his family did not compel a finding
    of past persecution); Lim v. INS, 
    224 F.3d 929
    , 936 (9th Cir. 2000) (death threats
    may rise to the level of persecution where they are “so menacing as to cause
    significant actual suffering or harm” (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted)).
    Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that
    Petitioners failed to establish an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution.
    In addition to the fact that Petitioners were not harmed, Petitioner Espindola
    Rivera’s husband and two sons continue to live “in the alleged danger zone” in
    Mexico without experiencing harm tied to their inquiries to law enforcement. See
    2                                      19-73104
    Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 
    542 F.3d 738
    , 743-44 (9th Cir. 2008) (crediting family
    member’s continued safety as substantial evidence against fear of persecution),
    abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 
    707 F.3d 1081
    , 1093
    (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 n.1
    (1992) (“To reverse the BIA finding we must find that the evidence not only
    supports that conclusion, but compels it . . . .”); Nagoulko v. INS, 
    333 F.3d 1012
    ,
    1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (possibility of future persecution “too speculative”).
    Thus, Petitioners’ asylum claim fails. See Halim v. Holder, 
    590 F.3d 971
    ,
    975-77 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding denial of asylum where substantial evidence
    supported the agency’s determination that petitioner did not establish past
    persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution). Because Petitioners failed to
    establish eligibility for asylum, they failed to establish eligibility for withholding
    of removal. See Zehatye, 
    453 F.3d at 1190
     (clear probability standard for
    withholding of removal imposes a heavier burden than the well-founded fear
    standard for asylum).
    Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
    Petitioners failed to show it is more likely than not they will be tortured by or with
    the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Mexico. See Aden v.
    Holder, 
    589 F.3d 1040
    , 1047 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating standard); see also Garcia-
    Milian v. Holder, 
    755 F.3d 1026
    , 1033-35 (9th Cir. 2014) (petitioner did not
    3                                     19-73104
    establish the necessary “state action” for CAT relief); Wakkary v. Holder, 
    558 F.3d 1049
    , 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2009) (no likelihood of torture).
    Finally, we reject as unsupported by the record Petitioners’ contention that
    the agency made “factual errors” in its analysis of their case.
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
    4                                  19-73104