Lauren Rother v. Leslie Lupenko , 691 F. App'x 350 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAY 18 2017
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LAUREN ROTHER; KRYSTAL                           No. 14-35771
    COLEMAN; ALLA DANCU; JOSEPH
    DRURY; JAMES JACKSON; RICKY
    FULLER; LAURIE GALTELAND;                        D.C. No. 3:08-cv-161 MO
    YOUNG EUN KIM; CATHY WELCH;
    MARY SAFATY; MARGRETTA
    PFEFFER; GOYH SAEPHANH;                          MEMORANDUM*
    JONATHAN THOMAS NICHOLS;
    TRISTA FLORES; MICQUAEL
    WALKER; NAI SAECHAO; JOEY LAW;
    DAVID M. PITTS; EVELYN
    GARFIELD; TIMOTHY JONES;
    JENNIFER MANEJA; SUSAN
    MATHENGE; AMANDA MOFFITT;
    AKIRA OKAZAKI; ANTONINA
    PRANTSEVICH; TONY
    SENGMANYVONG; and DANA
    THOMPSON,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.
    LESLIE LUPENKO; ANDREI
    LUPENKO; and TELELANGUAGE INC.,
    an Oregon corporation,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 8, 2017
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: BYBEE and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,** Senior District
    Judge.
    This suit alleged that Appellees violated Oregon state law and the federal
    Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by failing to timely pay Appellants minimum
    wages and overtime. In Rother v. Lupenko, 515 F. App’x 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2013)
    (“Rother I”), we reversed and remanded the district court’s dismissal of certain
    claims (the “remanded claims”) and affirmed the dismissal of other claims (the
    “affirmed claims”). Appellees subsequently made an Offer of Judgment under Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 68 to resolve the entire dispute for $12,500. Appellants accepted the
    offer and moved for fees as prevailing parties on all counts. The district court
    granted fees incurred on the remanded FLSA claims only for work performed
    during and after the appeal in Rother I, and denied all fees incurred on the affirmed
    claims. Appellants again appealed, and we reverse and remand in part and affirm in
    part.
    **   The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
    District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    2
    The Court reviews de novo whether a plaintiff is a prevailing party. La
    Asociacion de Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. City of Lake Forest, 
    624 F.3d 1083
    ,
    1089 (9th Cir. 2010). “Where the plaintiff’s success on a legal claim can be
    characterized as purely technical or de minimis, the plaintiff cannot recover fees as
    a prevailing party.” Kletzelman v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 
    91 F.3d 68
    , 71
    (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The district court erred in denying attorneys’ fees incurred on the remanded
    FLSA claims prior to the appeal in Rother I. The Offer of Judgment is for
    approximately 30% of what Appellants sought on the remanded claims, and
    approximately 70% of the initial judgment in Appellants’ favor. ; see Barrios v.
    Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 
    277 F.3d 1128
    , 1135 (9th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff’s victory
    was not de minimis where settlement award was 40% of amount sought); Quesada
    v. Thomason, 
    850 F.2d 537
    , 538–40 (9th Cir. 1988) (settlement award of 35% of
    initial amount sought was “very favorable result”). Appellants’ success is not
    purely technical or de minimis, and they are therefore prevailing parties as to these
    claims. We remand for the district court to determine a reasonable fee award for
    the FLSA claims, including fees incurred prior to the appeal in Rother I.
    3
    The district court properly denied attorneys’ fees incurred on the affirmed
    claims. Appellants have failed to articulate why the Supreme Court would have
    granted certiorari on these counts or why the Supreme Court would have
    overturned Rother I. Even if the district court could have entered judgment on the
    affirmed claims, the Offer of Judgment as to those claims was for nuisance value.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART.
    4