FTC v. Jacques Poujade ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        DEC 7 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,                       No.    19-56397
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
    5:18-cv-02104-SJO-PLA
    ROBB EVANS & ASSOCIATES LLC,
    Temporary Receiver,
    MEMORANDUM*
    Receiver-Appellee,
    v.
    JASON CARDIFF, individually and as an
    owner, officer, director, or member of
    Redwood Scientific Technologies, Inc. a
    California corporation; et al.,
    Defendants,
    and
    JACQUES POUJADE,
    Objector-Appellant.
    FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,                       No.    20-55066
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
    5:18-cv-02104-SJO-PLA
    v.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    JASON CARDIFF, individually and as an
    owner, officer, director, or member of
    Redwood Scientific Technologies, Inc. a
    California corporation; et al.,
    Defendants,
    v.
    TRUE PHARMASTRIP, INC., Proposed
    Intervenor,
    Movant-Appellant,
    and
    JACQUES POUJADE,
    Objector.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted November 20, 2020**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: PAEZ and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and ENGLAND,*** District Judge.
    1. Appellant Jacques Poujade appeals the district court’s decisions holding
    him in civil contempt for failing to transfer money to the receivership and for
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Morrison C. England, Jr., United States Senior Judge
    for the Eastern District of California, sitting by designation.
    2
    failing to comply with the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) discovery
    subpoena. A civil contempt order against a non-party becomes final for purposes
    of appeal once the district court finds the non-party to be in contempt and applies
    sanctions against him. David v. Hooker, Ltd., 
    560 F.2d 412
    , 415–16 (9th Cir.
    1977). Here, no sanctions were imposed against Poujade and he purged the
    contempt as to the transfer of money to the receivership. We therefore lack
    jurisdiction to review the contempt finding.
    2. Appellant and Proposed Intervenor True Pharmastrip, Inc. (“TPI”)
    appeals the district court’s order denying as untimely its motion to intervene both
    as a matter of right and permissively. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to intervene as a
    matter of right, except that we review a determination of untimeliness for an abuse
    of discretion. Orange Cnty. v. Air Cal., 
    799 F.2d 535
    , 537 (9th Cir. 1986). A
    district court’s denial of permissive intervention is reviewed for an abuse of
    discretion. 
    Id. at 539
    .
    “In determining whether a motion for intervention is timely, we consider
    three factors: (1) the stage of the proceeding at which an applicant seeks to
    intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason for and length of the
    delay.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 
    131 F.3d 1297
    , 1302
    (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). In denying TPI’s motion, the
    3
    district court found that TPI lacked justification for waiting almost two months to
    file its motion. While TPI argues this delay was caused by its meet and confer
    attempts with the FTC, the district court determined that this was not compelling as
    TPI should have realized early on that any meet and confer efforts would fail.
    Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
    determined that TPI’s actions were insufficient to warrant a two-month delay.
    Because timeliness is analyzed even more strictly for a motion for permissive
    intervention, TPI’s alternative request for permissive intervention is necessarily
    untimely. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 
    131 F.3d at 1308
    .
    DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART.
    4