Thomas Krzyminski v. Spokane County ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         DEC 9 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    THOMAS KRZYMINSKI,                              No.    20-35182
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00238-SAB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    SPOKANE COUNTY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Washington
    Stanley Allen Bastian, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 7, 2020**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: McKEOWN and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and ROTHSTEIN,***
    District Judge.
    Thomas Krzyminski appeals the district court’s dismissal of his action
    against Spokane County under the Uniformed Services Employment and
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, United States District Judge
    for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
    Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”), 
    38 U.S.C. §§ 4301
    –4344. Krzyminski
    worked as a lawyer for the County and alleged that he was denied pension credit
    for the time he served on active duty in the Washington Air National Guard, and
    that the County failed to inform him that he needed to pay make-up contributions
    within five years in order to receive the pension credit.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo the
    district court’s grant of dismissal and affirm. Williams v. Gerber Products Co.,
    
    552 F.3d 934
    , 937 (9th Cir. 2008).
    To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Krzyminski must allege
    “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
    v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007). Count 1 alleges that the County violated
    USERRA § 4318 by failing to give Krzyminski pension service credit for his
    military leave time and by failing to notify him of the make-up payment
    requirement. But the County had no obligation to take either of these actions, and
    therefore Count 1 fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
    Spokane County had no obligation to give Krzyminski pension service credit
    because Krzyminksi failed to pay the required make-up contributions within five
    years. Section 4318 requires employers to apply pension credit for military leave
    time only when certain conditions are met, including the condition that the
    employee pay make-up contributions within five years. See 38 U.S.C.
    2
    § 4318(b)(2); see also 
    20 C.F.R. § 1002.262
    (c) (“If the employee’s plan is
    contributory and he or she does not make up his or her contributions . . . , he or she
    will not receive the . . . accrued benefit attributable to his or her contribution.”).
    Although Krzyminski argues that pension service credit is not an “accrued benefit”
    and is therefore not contingent on the make-up payments, the regulations are to the
    contrary. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 1002.261
     (“[A]ccrued benefit will be increased for the
    period of service once he or she is reemployed and, if applicable, has . . . made any
    employee contributions that may be required to be made under the plan.”).
    Because the pension service credit is contingent on the make-up payments, which
    Krzyminski did not pay, the County had no obligation to provide the credit.
    The County likewise had no obligation to notify Krzyminski of the make-up
    payment requirement. Krzyminski argues that the County’s obligation to
    “allocate” its make-up contribution for the employee implies an obligation to
    notify the employee of the requirement. 
    20 C.F.R. § 1002.261
    . Even if that
    inference were valid, the argument fails because in this instance, the allocation
    obligation does not apply. The allocation obligation applies only when the
    retirement plan is a “defined contribution plan.” 
    20 C.F.R. § 1002.261
    . The plan
    here—“PERS 2”—is instead a “defined benefit plan.” See 
    38 U.S.C. § 4318
    (a); 
    20 C.F.R. § 1002.260
    ; Probst v. Dep’t of Retirement Sys., 
    271 P.3d 966
    ,
    967 (Wash. App. 2012) (describing PERS 2 as a “defined benefit plan”). Because
    3
    the County had neither an obligation to provide the pension service credit nor an
    obligation to provide notice of the make-up payment requirement, Count 1 fails to
    state a claim and was therefore properly dismissed by the district court.1
    Count 2 alleges that the County’s failure to give pension service credit also
    violated USERRA §§ 4312–4313. But because sections 4312 and 4313 impose no
    such obligation on the County, Count 2 was properly dismissed. Sections 4312
    and 4313 provide that a returning servicemember employee must be returned to the
    seniority, status, and pay-rate that the employee would have obtained but for the
    military leave. Krzyminski argues that the term “seniority” includes pension
    service credit. Krzyminski asserts that by declining to give him pension service
    credit, Spokane County failed to return him to his proper position of “seniority.”
    This interpretation of sections 4312 and 4313 is untenable because it would render
    meaningless a separate section of the statute—4318—which lays out how to obtain
    pension service credit. See 
    38 U.S.C. § 4318
    (a)(1)(A) (“[T]he right to pension
    benefits of a person reemployed under this chapter shall be determined under this
    section.”). Because the term “seniority” in sections 4312 and 4313 does not
    encompass pension service credit, the County did not violate the provision by
    1
    Krzyminski also argues that the district court’s dismissal of this count was error
    because it relied on state law even though USERRA § 4302(b) explicitly
    supersedes any state law that limits its rights and benefits. This argument is
    unavailing. The district court noted state law, but did not rely on it.
    4
    failing to provide such credit.
    Count 3 alleges that the County also violated section 4334, but section 4334
    only requires an employer to post a notice written by the Secretary of Labor
    “where employers customarily place notices for employees.” 
    38 U.S.C. § 4334
    (a),(b). Krzyminski does not allege that the County failed to post the notice,
    and therefore Count 3 was properly dismissed.
    Citing to Imel v. Laborers Pension Tr. Fund for N. California, 
    904 F.2d 1327
    , 1330–1331 (9th Cir. 1990), Krzyminski urges this court to read the statute
    liberally. But even on a liberal reading, no obligation of the County to provide the
    pension credit and to provide notice of the make-up payments can be found.
    AFFIRMED.
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