Kathryn Jones v. Medtronic ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 9 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KATHRYN MARIE JONES, No. 19-16800
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00383-SPL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MEDTRONIC; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 2, 2020**
Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Kathryn Marie Jones appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her diversity action alleging products liability claims under Arizona
law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011)
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6)); Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008) (dismissal
for lack of personal jurisdiction). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed defendants Medtronic Sofamor Danek
USA Incorporated and Medtronic PLC because Jones failed to allege facts
sufficient to establish that these defendants had continuous and systematic contacts
with Arizona to establish general personal jurisdiction, or sufficient claim-related
contacts with Arizona to provide the court with specific personal jurisdiction over
defendants. See CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1074-76
(9th Cir. 2011) (discussing requirements for general and specific personal
jurisdiction).
The district court properly dismissed Jones’s claim for failure to warn
because Jones failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the warning labels
pertaining to the devices used during her surgery contained informational defects.
See Watts v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 365 P.3d 944, 948 (Ariz. 2016) (a defendant
may be held liable for failure to warn “based on informational defects
encompassing instructions and warnings that render a product defective and
unreasonably dangerous” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Jones’s claims for design and
manufacturing defect because Jones failed to allege facts sufficient to show a
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manufacturing or design defect. See Stilwell v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 482 F.3d
1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth tests for defectively designed product
under Arizona law); Gomulka v. Yavapai Mach. & Auto Parts, Inc., 745 P.2d 986,
988-89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (setting forth test for defectively manufactured
product under Arizona law).
The district court properly dismissed Jones’s claims for adulteration and
misbranding because Jones failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible
claim. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-1965, 32-1966, 32-1967; Hebbe v. Pliler, 627
F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be construed
liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Jones’s first
amended complaint without further leave to amend because amendment would
have been futile. See Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1041 (setting forth standard of review
and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment
would be futile).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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