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 2020-12

Bradley Ruggles v. City of Scottsdale ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        DEC 9 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRADLEY J. RUGGLES,                             No.    19-17470
Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:18-cv-02950-SPL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF SCOTTSDALE,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
M. McCOY, named as City of Scottsdale
Police Officer,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 2, 2020**
Before:      WALLACE, CLIFTON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Bradley J. Ruggles appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
dismissing his
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging federal and state law claims. We
have jurisdiction under
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a dismissal for
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Walker v.
Beard,
    789 F.3d 1125
    , 1131 (9th Cir. 2015). We may affirm on any basis
supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul,
    547 F.3d 1055
    , 1058-59 (9th Cir.
2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Ruggles’s intentional infliction of
emotional distress (“IIED”) claim as time-barred because Ruggles failed to bring
this claim within the applicable one-year statute of limitations. See
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821
    ; Watkins v. Arpaio,
    367 P.3d 72
    , 76-77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (discussing
one-year statute of limitations period for IIED claim against an Arizona public
entity and proper application of “continuing wrong” doctrine).
Dismissal of Ruggles’s malicious prosecution claim was proper because
Ruggles failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe v.
Pliler,
    627 F.3d 338
    , 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are
construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a
plausible claim for relief); Gonzales v. City of Phoenix,
    52 P.3d 184
    , 187 (Ariz.
2002) (en banc) (discussing probable cause element of malicious prosecution claim
under Arizona law); Carroll v. Kalar,
    545 P.2d 411
    , 412 (Ariz. 1976) (“The failure
to establish a lack of probable cause is a complete defense to an action for
2                                     19-17470
malicious prosecution.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying further leave to
amend because amendment would have been futile. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of
Am.,
    232 F.3d 719
    , 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would
be futile).
We reject as without merit Ruggles’s contentions that the district court erred
by failing to allow oral argument or held him to the high standard of a lawyer.
AFFIRMED.
3                                   19-17470