Douglas Rough v. Chase Bank ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 10 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DOUGLAS H. ROUGH, No. 19-35902
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-01555-RAJ
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHASE BANK; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 2, 2020**
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Douglas H. Rough appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging fraud and related federal claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Puri v. Khalsa, 844
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Rough’s action because Rough failed
to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the heightened pleading standard for fraud set
forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). See Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567
F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing heightened pleading standard under
Rule 9(b), which applies to state law claims alleging fraudulent conduct); see also
Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 557 (9th Cir. 2010) (elements of a
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim); Adams v. King
County, 192 P.3d 891, 902 (Wash. 2008) (en banc) (elements of a fraud claim
under Washington law).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rough leave to
amend because amendment would have been futile. See Gordon v. City of
Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that leave to amend may be denied if amendment would be futile).
We reject as meritless Rough’s contentions that he was held to a higher
standard as a pro se plaintiff, and that the district court should have allowed him to
conduct discovery.
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We do not consider allegations not properly raised before the district court,
or matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief.
See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 19-35902