Peter Harrell v. Costco , 422 F. App'x 635 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            MAR 18 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    PETER T. HARRELL,                                No. 10-35068
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 1:08-cv-03092-PA
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    COSTCO; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Owen M. Panner, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 8, 2011 **
    Before:        FARRIS, O’SCANNLAIN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    Peter T. Harrell appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
    in his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging that defendants unlawfully accused him of
    theft. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo. Olsen v.
    Idaho State Bd. of Med., 
    363 F.3d 916
    , 922 (9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ground supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 
    547 F.3d 1055
    , 1058-59 (9th
    Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on the 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     claims because defendants’ complaint to the police and execution of the
    sworn criminal complaint, without more, did not convert them into state actors.
    See Collins v. Womancare, 
    878 F.2d 1145
    , 1155 (9th Cir. 1989).
    Summary judgment was properly granted on the malicious prosecution claim
    because Harrell failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
    prosecutors’ decisions were influenced by any information misreported or withheld
    by defendants. See Richer v. Poisson, 
    903 P.2d 932
    , 935 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
    Summary judgment was properly granted on the false arrest and false
    imprisonment claims because Harrell failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact
    as to whether he was unlawfully confined. See Hiber v. Creditors Collection Serv.
    of Lincoln Cnty., Inc., 
    961 P.2d 898
    , 901 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on the slander, libel,
    and defamation claims because Harrell failed to raise a genuine issue of material
    fact as to whether defendants’ statements were not privileged. See DeLong v. Yu
    Enters., Inc., 
    47 P.3d 8
    , 10 (Or. 2002).
    2                                    10-35068
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on the intentional
    infliction of emotional distress claim because Harrell failed to raise a genuine issue
    of material fact as to whether defendants engaged in outrageous conduct. See
    House v. Hicks, 
    179 P.3d 730
    , 736-37 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on the negligence
    claims because Harrell failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
    defendants’ conduct “foreseeably pose[d] an unreasonable risk of harm” to him.
    Cain v. Rijken, 
    717 P.2d 140
    , 145 (Or. 1986).
    We are unpersuaded by Harrell’s remaining contentions, including his
    contention that the district court abused its discretion by denying him further
    discovery.
    Harrell’s “Objection and Motion to Strike” is granted in part as to pages
    141-42 of the supplemental excerpts of record and footnotes 4-5 on page 23 of the
    answering brief. The “Objection and Motion to Strike” is otherwise denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                      10-35068