United States v. Brandon Buckles , 666 F. App'x 670 ( 2016 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 12 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 15-30257
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
4:15-cr-00001-BMM-1
v.
BRANDON RAY BUCKLES, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 6, 2016**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, TALLMAN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Brandon Buckles appeals his conviction for one count of sexual abuse, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1153(a), 2242, and one count of making a false statement to a federal
officer, 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). We review for abuse of discretion the exclusion of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
evidence. Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544, 1550 (9th Cir. 1992). We review de
novo the denial of the motion for a judgment of acquittal, and we will not overturn
the conviction if, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Norwood, 603 F.3d 1063, 1068
(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Rios, 449 F.3d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir.
2006)). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We are not persuaded by Buckles’s argument that excluding evidence of his
prior sexual relationship with the victim violated his Sixth Amendment rights.
Buckles failed to raise this argument at trial, and he has not established that the
district court committed plain error in excluding the evidence here. See United
States v. Pino-Noriega, 189 F.3d 1089, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Additionally, the
record reflects that the district court appropriately considered Buckles’s interest in
admitting the evidence, its probative value, and its prejudicial effect. See Wood,
957 F.2d at 1551–54. Buckles was granted leeway during cross examination—by,
for instance, eliciting testimony regarding the victim’s general dislike for Buckles
and her contradictory statements during the investigation—which gave the jury
“sufficient information” to assess the victim’s credibility. See id. at 1550 (internal
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quotation marks and citation omitted). In any event, excluding this evidence did
not prejudice the outcome of the trial given the compelling DNA evidence
supporting Buckles’s conviction. See United States v. Valensia, 299 F.3d 1068,
1076–77 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
Buckles’s contention that substantial evidence does not support the materiality
element under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 also fails. Under § 1001, “[a] statement is
considered material if it has the propensity to influence agency action; actual
influence on agency action is not an element of the crime.” United States v.
Vaughn, 797 F.2d 1485, 1490 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the trial testimony reflected
that Buckles’s false statements influenced the investigating agent’s actions and
decisions. Buckles even acknowledged that the statements were “important.” As
such, there was substantial evidence presented upon which a reasonable jury could
find that Buckles’s false statement was material.
AFFIRMED.
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