Steve Martinez v. National Railroad Passenger Co , 438 F. App'x 595 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             JUN 16 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    STEVE MARTINEZ,                                  No. 10-55215
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:09-cv-06500-PA-RZ
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
    CORPORATION, a government-owned
    corporation doing business as Amtrak,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 8, 2011 **
    Pasadena, California
    Before: D.W. NELSON and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and PIERSOL, Senior
    District Judge.***
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
    District Court for South Dakota, Sioux Falls, sitting by designation.
    The district court properly granted Amtrak’s motion to dismiss for failure to
    state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Martinez
    failed to allege discrimination on the basis of gender: neither the first amended
    complaint nor the proffered second amended complaint alleged the existence of
    any direct evidence of gender discrimination (such as a discriminatory comment by
    an Amtrak decisionmaker), see, e.g., EEOC v. Boeing Co., 
    577 F.3d 1044
    , 1050
    (9th Cir. 2009), or circumstantial evidence of such gender discrimination (such as a
    similarly-situated female employee who was not fired after engaging in consensual
    sexual conduct on the job), see, e.g., Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 
    518 F.3d 1097
    , 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, Martinez’s reliance on Sassaman v.
    Gamache is misplaced, as Martinez offered no evidence of sex stereotyping
    comparable to Gamache’s justification of Sassaman’s firing: “you probably did
    what she said you did because you’re male and nobody would believe you
    anyway.” 
    566 F.3d 307
    , 311 (2d Cir. 2009). Because Martinez failed to establish
    a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of gender, the district court did not
    err in dismissing Martinez’s California Fair Employment and Housing claim or his
    state wrongful termination claim. See Stevenson v. Superior Court, 
    941 P.2d 1157
    ,
    1165 (Cal. 1997); Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente Int’l, 
    151 Cal. App. 4th 1102
    ,
    1108–09 (2007).
    Page 2 of 3
    Even assuming Martinez could bring a § 1983 claim against Amtrak or a
    Bivens claim against Amtrak officials, both his first amended complaint and his
    proffered second amended complaint failed to state a claim for any constitutional
    violation. Because Martinez failed to allege discrimination on the basis of gender,
    his equal protection claim fails. Moreover, because Martinez did not allege that
    Amtrak prevented him from speaking or retaliated against him for so doing, his
    complaint fails to state a claim for a First Amendment violation. Finally,
    Martinez’s due process claim fails because he received both “notice and an
    opportunity to respond” before he was terminated, see Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v.
    Loudermill, 
    470 U.S. 532
    , 546 (1985), and his complaint did not allege any facts
    suggesting that the post-termination officer was biased against him, cf. Clements v.
    Airport Auth. of Washoe Cnty., 
    69 F.3d 321
    , 333 (9th Cir. 1995).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez’s motion
    for leave to amend his complaint to state a Bivens claim, as amendment would have
    been futile. See Bonin v. Calderon, 
    59 F.3d 815
    , 845 (9th Cir. 1995).
    AFFIRMED.
    Page 3 of 3